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Abstract
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all
candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular
employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper
we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one
employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We ﬁnd that introducing a signaling mechanism
increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in ﬁrm welfare is
ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets.
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11 Introduction
Job seekers in labor markets often apply for many positions, as there is a low cost for applying and
a high value for being employed. Consequently, many employers face the near impossible task of
reviewing and evaluating hundreds of applications. Moreover, since pursuing candidates is often
costly, employers may need to assess not only the quality of an applicant, but also whether the
applicant is attainable: that is, whether the candidate is likely to ultimately accept a job oﬀer,
should the employer make one. In this paper we study a mechanism that aids employers in this
evaluation process by allowing applicants to credibly signal information about their preferences for
positions.
In practice, in many markets that suﬀer from this form of application congestion, candidates
communicate special interest for a select number of places. For example, in college admissions in
the United States, many universities have early admission programs, where high school seniors may
apply to exactly one college before the general application period. Evidence suggests that universi-
ties respond to such action in that it is easier to get into a college through early admission programs
(Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser, 2003).1 Another example of applicants signaling interest can be
found in the market for entry-level clinical psychologists, which in the early 1990’s was organized
as a telephone-based market. On “match day,” program directors called applicants to make oﬀers,
and candidates were, at any moment, allowed to hold on to at most one oﬀer. At the end of match
day, all non-accepted oﬀers were automatically declared as rejected. Due in part to its limited time
frame, this market suﬀered from congestion, and it was common for program directors to make
oﬀers out of their preference order to applicants who credibly indicated they would accept an oﬀer
immediately (Roth and Xing, 1997).2
Some markets have formal, market-wide mechanisms that allow participants to signal prefer-
ences, and the formal nature of the signals ensures credibility. Since 2006, The American Economic
Association (AEA) has operated a signaling service to facilitate the job search for economics grad-
uate students. Using this service, students can send signals to up to two employers to indicate their
interest in receiving an interview at the annual Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meeting.
Coles et al. (2010) provide suggestive evidence that sending a signal of interest increases the chances
of receiving an interview. Since interviews take place over a single weekend, departments typically
interview about twenty candidates out of hundreds of applicants, which suggests that most depart-
1Under single early application programs, universities often require that an applicant not apply early to other
schools, and this is often enforced by high school guidance counselors. In another example of colleges looking for
signs of interest, many schools take great care to note whether applicants visit the campus, which presumably is
costly for parents in terms of time and money. This can also be taken into account when colleges decide whom to
admit.
2Congestion in the telephone market was costly for program directors who worried that their oﬀer would be held
the whole match day and then rejected in the last moments, leaving them to ﬁll the position in a hectic “aftermarket”
with only a few leftover candidates. As an example of oﬀer strategy, the directors of one internship program decided
to make their ﬁrst oﬀers (for their ﬁve positions) to numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 12 on their rank-order list of candidates,
with the rationale that 3, 5, and 12 had indicated that they would accept immediately and that 1 and 2 were so
attractive as to be worth taking chances on. Anecdotal evidence suggests that promises to accept an oﬀer were
binding. The market was relatively small, and as one program director mentioned: “you see these people again.”
2ments must strategically choose from among their candidates that are above the bar.3 Though not
labor markets, some online dating websites allow participants to send signals to potential partners.
For example in the matchmaking service of the website “Hot or Not,” participants can send each
other virtual ﬂowers that purportedly increase the chances of receiving a positive response.4 In a
ﬁeld experiment on a major Korean online dating website, Lee et al. (2011) study the eﬀect of a
user attaching one of a limited number of “virtual roses” to a date request. They ﬁnd that users of
both genders are more likely to accept a request when a virtual rose is attached.5
These examples all share three important features. First, in each case, substantial frictions lead
to market congestion: employers (or colleges or dating partners) are unable to give full attention to
all possible candidates when making decisions. Second, applicants are ready to provide information
about their preferences over employers. Third, employers value this preference information and are
prepared to act on it.
For employers to take useful action, preference signals must be credible. But simply declaring
one’s interest typically bears almost no cost, and job seekers have an incentive to indicate particular
interest to many employers, regardless of how strong their preferences towards these employers
actually are. Hence, absent any credibility guarantee, employers may struggle to discern which
preference information is sincere and which is simply cheap talk. So while candidates may wish
to signal their preferences, and employers may value learning candidate preferences, inability to
credibly convey information may prevent any gains from preference signaling from being realized.
In this paper, we investigate how a signaling mechanism that limits the number of signals
a job seeker may send can overcome the credibility problem and improve the welfare of market
participants. We develop a model that can account for the three stylized facts mentioned above.
In our model, ﬁrms may make a limited number of oﬀers to workers, so that ﬁrms must carefully
select the workers to whom they make oﬀers. We focus on the strategic question of oﬀer choice
and abstract away the question of acquiring information that determines preferences. Hence, we
assume that each agent knows her own preferences over agents on the other side of the market, but
is uncertain of the preferences of other agents.
3Similar mechanisms exist for non-academic jobs. For example, Skydeck360, a student-operated company at
Harvard, oﬀers a signaling service for MBA students in their search for internships and full-time jobs. Each registered
student can send up to ten signals to employers via their secure website. (See http://skydeck360.posterous.com for
detail.)
4In this case the number of ﬂowers one may send is unlimited, but each ﬂower is costly. Signals of interest may be
helpful in dating markets because pursuing partners bears real costs. At the very least, each user may be limited in
the number of serious dates she can have in a given period. “As James Hong from HotorNot tells it, his virtual ﬂower
service has three components: there’s the object itself represented by a graphical ﬂower icon, there’s the gesture of
someone sending the ﬂower to their online crush, and ﬁnally, there’s the trophy eﬀect of everyone else being able to see
that you got a ﬂower. People on HotorNot are paying $10 to send the object of their aﬀection a virtual ﬂower – which
is a staggering 3-4x what you might pay for a real ﬂower!” (from http://www.viralblog.com/research/why-digital-
consumers-buy-virtual-goods/) See http://www.hotornot.com/m/?ﬂowerBrochure=1 for a description of HotorNot’s
virtual ﬂower oﬀerings.
5This dating website targets people looking for marriage partners, rather than people who want many dates.
Hence, dates may be perceived as particularly costly, so users must decide carefully on whom to “spend” a date. The
study found that candidates of average attractiveness, who may worry that date oﬀers are only “safety” oﬀers, are
particularly responsive to signals of special interest.
3In our model, we consider a class of block-correlated worker preferences. In particular, ﬁrms can
be partitioned in blocks, so that all workers agree about ranking of ﬁrm blocks; however, within
a block, workers have idiosyncratic preferences over ﬁrms. Firm preferences are idiosyncratic and
uniformly distributed. This modeling choice of preferences allows for correlation of workers’ prefer-
ences, keeps the model tractable, and adequately describes many characteristics of labor markets.
For example, in the job market for new PhD economists, economics departments may be roughly
ranked based on academic output or other factors. Graduate students form their preferences based
on not only this academic ranking, but also on idiosyncratic factors including family preferences,
location, climate and colleagues. Block correlation is meant to capture the notion that while stu-
dents may roughly agree on ranking of tiers of departments, their idiosyncratic preferences dictate
which departments are preferred within each tier.
Workers have the opportunity to send a signal to one ﬁrm, where each signal is binary in nature
and does not transmit any further information. Firms observe their signals, but not the signals
of other ﬁrms, and then each ﬁrm simultaneously makes exactly one oﬀer to a worker. Finally,
workers choose oﬀers from those available to them. We focus on equilibria in anonymous strategies
to eliminate any coordination devices beyond the signaling mechanism.
We show that, in expectation, introducing a signaling mechanism increases both the number of
matches as well as the welfare of workers. Intuitively, when ﬁrms make oﬀers to workers who send
them signals, these oﬀers are unlikely to overlap, leading to a higher expected number of matches.
Furthermore, workers are not only more likely to be matched, but are also more likely to be matched
to a ﬁrm they prefer the most. On the other hand, when a ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to a worker who has
signaled it, this creates strong competition for ﬁrms in the same block who would like to make an
oﬀer to that same worker because, for example, they rank that worker highest. Hence, by responding
to signals, that is, being more likely to make oﬀers to workers who have signaled them, ﬁrms may
generate a negative spillover on other ﬁrms in the same block. Consequently, the eﬀect on ﬁrm
welfare from introducing a signaling mechanism is ambiguous; welfare for a ﬁrm depends on the
balance between individual beneﬁt from responding to signals and the negative spillover generated
by other ﬁrms responding to signals. Furthermore, we show that the degree to which a ﬁrm responds
to signals is a case of strategic complements. When one ﬁrm responds more to signals, it becomes
riskier for other ﬁrms to make oﬀers to workers who have not sent them signals. Consequently,
multiple equilibria, with varying responsiveness to signals, may exist. If there is a single block of
ﬁrms, these equilibria can be welfare ranked: workers prefer equilibria where ﬁrms respond more to
signals, while ﬁrms prefer the equilibria where they respond less.
To understand when a signaling mechanism might be most helpful, we compare performance
across market settings. To do this, we focus on a simpler environment with a single block of ﬁrms
where agents care about getting a match, but not the quality of the match. Hence, the value
of introducing a signaling mechanism is simply the expected increase in the number of matches.
For such an environment, we ﬁnd that the value of a signaling mechanism is maximal for balanced
markets; that is, markets where the number of ﬁrms and workers are of roughly the same magnitude.
4We further show that the increase in the number of matches is roughly homogenous of degree one in
the number of ﬁrms and workers. That is, signaling mechanisms are equally important for large and
small markets in terms of the expected increase in the fraction of matched participants. Finally, we
show that when we extend the number of periods in a market, the value of signaling is reduced, as
additional periods serve as an alternative means of mitigating market congestion.
Our approach is related to several strands of literature. A standard interpretation of signaling
and its eﬀectiveness is that applicants have private information that is pertinent to how valuable an
employee they would be. In Spence’s classic signaling model (Spence, 1973), applicants use wasteful
costly signals, such as education, to signal their type, such as their ability. Hoppe, Moldovanu
and Sela (2009) extend this idea to an environment where agents on both sides of the market
may send signals.6 More recently, Avery and Levin (2010) model early application in US college
admissions as a way for students to signal college-speciﬁc quality, such as enthusiasm for a particular
college. In their model, colleges explicitly derive more utility from having enthusiastic students in
their freshman class than they do from other, equally able students. By contrast, in our model
we abstract away from such motives and instead show how congestion, stemming from the explicit
opportunity costs of making oﬀers, can generate room for useful preference signaling.
A more closely related strand of literature is that of strategic information transmission, or
“cheap talk,” between a sender and receiver, introduced in Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our
model, however, we consider a multi-stage game with many senders (workers) and many receivers
(ﬁrms), where the structure of allowable signals plays a distinctive role. Each sender must choose the
receiver to whom she will send one of her limited, identical signals, and the scarcity of signals induces
credibility. Each receiver knows only whether a sender has sent a signal to it or not, and receives no
additional information. While Crawford and Sobel (1982) study a information transmission problem
between the sender and receiver, our setting includes an additional coordination problem among
receivers who must decide whom to make an oﬀer. Nevertheless, some features of Crawford and
Sobel persist in our model. Signals are “cheap” in the sense that they do not have a direct inﬂuence
on agent payoﬀs. Each agent has only a limited number of signals, so there is an opportunity cost
associated with sending a signal. Finally, in our model there always exist babbling equilibria where
agents ignore signals; hence, the introduction of a signaling mechanism always enlarges the set of
equilibria.
Like the classical search literature, our model considers decentralized agent interactions (see e.g.
Montgomery, 1991; Peters, 1991). Our paper contributes to this line of work via its analysis of a
mechanism that helps agents on one side of the market inﬂuence whether they will be approached
by the agents on the other side of the market. Our model considers incomplete information with a
ﬁnite number of agents, compared to the complete information models with a continuum of agents
that are common in this literature.7 Since we abstract away from wage competition and search
frictions we do not study the equilibrium wage dispersion and the frictionless limit of markets that
6See also Damiano and Li (2007) and Hopkins (forthcoming) for related models.
7For the relationship between ﬁnite and inﬁnite economies in a directed search framework see Galenianos and
Kircher (2012).
5are central questions in this area of research (see e.g. Kircher, 2009).
While to our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to introduce preference signaling in decentralized mar-
kets, papers by Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2012) and Lee and Schwarz (2007) deal with
preference signaling in the presence of centralized clearinghouses. Parendo (2010) analyzes co-
ordination signaling in a model of complete information with identical employers and commonly
ranked employees. Ely and Siegel (2010) study how interview decisions transmit information in a
common-value labor setting with many ﬁrms and one worker.
In summary, our paper models the introduction of a signaling mechanism in markets where
interviews or oﬀers are costly for ﬁrms, either in direct monetary terms or because of opportu-
nity costs. Our results suggest potentially large welfare gains for workers, and an increase in the
expected total number of matches. Furthermore, as the experience with the economic job market
shows, introducing a signaling mechanism can be a low cost, unintrusive means of improving market
outcomes. As such we see our paper as part of the larger market design literature (see Roth, 2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins with a simple example, and Section 3 discusses
the oﬀer games with and without a signaling mechanism. Section 4 analyzes equilibria properties
for both setups. Section 5 considers the impact of introducing a signaling mechanism on the welfare
of agents. Section 6 analyzes the robustness of the welfare results across various market structures.
Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Example
In this section we lay out a simple example that shows the eﬀects of introducing a signaling mech-
anism and highlights some of our main ﬁndings. Consider a market with two ﬁrms ff1;f2g and
two workers fw1;w2g. For each agent, a match with one’s most preferred partner from the other
side of the market yields payoﬀ 1, while a match with one’s second choice partner yields x 2 (0;1).
Remaining unmatched yields payoﬀ 0.
Ex-ante, agent preferences are random, uniform and independent. That is, for each ﬁrm f, the
probability that f prefers worker w1 to worker w2 is one half, as is the probability that f prefers w2
to w1. Worker preferences over ﬁrms are similarly symmetric. Agents learn their own preferences,
but not the preferences of other agents.
We ﬁrst examine behavior in a game where once agent preferences are realized, each ﬁrm may
make a single oﬀer to a worker. Workers then accept at most one of their available oﬀers. We will
examine sequential equilibria, which guarantees that workers accept their best available oﬀer.
In the unique equilibrium of this game where ﬁrm strategies do not depend on the name of the
worker,8 each ﬁrm simply makes an oﬀer to its most preferred worker. This follows because ﬁrms
cannot discern which worker is more likely to accept an oﬀer. In this congested market there is a
ﬁfty percent chance that both ﬁrms make an oﬀer to the same worker, in which case there will only
be one match. Hence, on average there are 1.5 matches, and the expected payoﬀ for each ﬁrm is
8See Section 3 for a formal deﬁnition of anonymous strategies.
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41 + 1
40 = 0:75. For workers, if they receive exactly one oﬀer, it is equally likely to be from their
ﬁrst or second choice ﬁrm. There is also a ﬁfty percent chance that one worker receives two oﬀers,
hence attaining a payoﬀ of one while the other worker receives zero. The expected payoﬀ for each
worker is then (2 + x)=4:
We now introduce a signaling mechanism: before ﬁrms make oﬀers, each worker may send a
signal to a single ﬁrm. Each signal has a binary nature: either a ﬁrm receives a signal from a
particular worker or not, and signals do not not transmit any other information. We focus on non-
babbling equilibria, where ﬁrms interpret a signal as a sign of being the more preferred ﬁrm of that
worker, and workers send a signal to their more preferred ﬁrm.9
To analyze ﬁrm behavior, note that a ﬁrm that receives a signal from its top worker will make
this worker an oﬀer, since it will certainly be accepted. If on the other hand a ﬁrm receives no
signals, it again optimally makes an oﬀer to its top worker, as symmetry implies the workers are
equally likely to accept an oﬀer. The interesting strategic decision a ﬁrm must make is when it
receives a signal only from its second ranked worker. In this case the other ﬁrm also receives exactly
one signal. We say a ﬁrm “responds” to the signal if it makes the signaling worker an oﬀer, and
“ignores” the signal if it instead makes an oﬀer to its top worker, which did not send it a signal.
Suppose f1 prefers w1 to w2 and only w2 sent a signal to f1, which implies w1 sent a signal to f2:
Clearly, whenever f1 makes an oﬀer to w2, f1 receives x: Suppose f1 instead makes an oﬀer to w1,
who sent a signal to f2: If f2 responds to signals, then f2 also makes an oﬀer to w1, which w1 will
accept, hence leaving f1 a payoﬀ of 0. If f2 ignores signals, then there is still a ﬁfty percent chance
that w1 is actually f2’s ﬁrst choice, in which case an oﬀer is tendered and accepted, so that f1 again
receives 0. Otherwise, f1 receives 1. Table 1 summarizes f1’s payoﬀs conditional on receiving a
signal from its second ranked worker, and the strategies of f2.
Table 1: Firm f1’s payoﬀs conditional on receiving a signal from its second
ranked worker.
f1 \ f2 Respond Ignore
Respond x x
Ignore 0 1=2
Table 1 shows that strategies of ﬁrms are strategic complements. If a ﬁrm responds to signals,
then the other ﬁrm is weakly better oﬀ from responding to signals as well. In this example, if f2
switches from the action ignore (not making an oﬀer to a second choice worker who has signaled)
to the safe action of responding (making an oﬀer to a second choice worker who has signaled), then
f1 optimally also takes the safe action of responding.
Turning to equilibrium analysis, note that if x > 0:5 there is a unique equilibrium in which both
ﬁrms respond to signals. When x < 0:5, that is when the value of the ﬁrst choice worker is much
9Note that there is no equilibrium where ﬁrms expect signals from workers, but interpret them as a particular lack
of interest and hence reduce the probability of making an oﬀer to a signaling worker. If this were the case, workers
would simply not send any signal. There are, however, babbling equilibria where no information is transmitted,
though we will not focus on those in this paper, as they are equivalent to not having a signaling device.
7greater than that of the second ranked worker, there exist two equilibria in pure strategies. In the
ﬁrst, both ﬁrms respond to signals (Respond-Respond) and in the second both ﬁrm ignore signals
(Ignore-Ignore).10 Table 2 summarizes welfare properties of these equilibria. Note that the expected
ﬁrm and worker payoﬀs, as well as the expected number of matches when signals are ignored are
the same as when there is no signaling mechanism, since agent actions in these two settings are
identical.11
Table 2: Firm payoﬀs, worker payoﬀs, and number of matches when both
ﬁrms use the same strategy.
Firm Payoﬀs Worker Payoﬀs Number of Matches
Respond-Respond (5 + 2x)=8 (6 + x)=8 7=4
Ignore-Ignore 3=4 (2 + x)=4 3=2
Whenever there are multiple equilibria (x < 0:5), we can rank them in terms of ﬁrm welfare,
worker welfare, and the expected number of matches. Workers and ﬁrms are opposed in their
preferences over equilibria: workers prefer the equilibrium in which both ﬁrms respond to signals
while ﬁrms prefer the equilibrium in which they both ignore signals. Intuitively, while one ﬁrm may
privately gain from responding to a signal, such an action may negatively aﬀect the other ﬁrm. The
expected number of matches in the equilibrium when both ﬁrms respond to signals is always greater
than in the equilibrium when both ﬁrms ignore the signals.
These welfare results enable us to study the eﬀects of introducing a signaling mechanism, as
outcomes in the oﬀer game without signals are identical to those when both ﬁrms ignore signals
(even if the Ignore-Ignore equilibrium does not exist). The expected number of matches and the
welfare of workers in the oﬀer game with signals in any non-babbling equilibrium are greater than
in the oﬀer game with no signals. The welfare of ﬁrms changes ambiguously with the introduction
of a signaling mechanism. We now show that these results generalize.
3 Model: The Oﬀer Game Without and With Signals
Let F = ff1;:::;fFg be the set of ﬁrms, and W = fw1;:::;wWg be the set of workers, with jFj = F
and jWj = W. We consider markets with at least two ﬁrms and two workers. Firms and workers
have preferences over each other. For each ﬁrm f, let f be the set of all possible preference lists
over workers, where f 2 f is a vector of length W. We use the convention that the worker of
10There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium whenever there are two pure strategy equilibria. Properties of this
equilibrium coincide with those in the equilibrium where both ﬁrms respond to signals.
11When both ﬁrms respond to signals, since each ﬁrm has a ﬁfty percent chance of receiving a signal from its ﬁrst
choice worker, half the time this strategy yields payoﬀ of one. Otherwise a ﬁrm has a 1=4 chance of receiving a signal
from its second choice worker only, yielding a payoﬀ of x: With a 1=4 chance a ﬁrm receives no signal, in which case
it makes an oﬀer to its ﬁrst choice worker, who will accept with ﬁfty percent probability (whenever she is not the










8 . Payoﬀs for workers
can similarly be calculated given these outcomes. Furthermore, when one ﬁrm receives all signals (which happens
half the time) there is a ﬁfty percent chance of ﬁrms making oﬀers to the same worker, and hence, of only one match







8rank one is the most preferred worker, while the worker of rank W is the least preferred worker.
The set of all ﬁrm preference proﬁles is F = (f)
F. Firm f with preference list f values a match
with worker w as u(f;w); where u(f;) is a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function. Firms
are symmetric in the following sense: a ﬁrm’s utility for a match depends only on a worker’s rank.
That is, for any permutation  of worker indices; we have u((f);(w)) = u(f;w):12 Furthermore,
all ﬁrms have the same utility function u(;).
Similarly, we deﬁne w, w and W for workers. Worker w with preference list w values a
match with ﬁrm f as v(w;f); where match utility again depends only on rank, and all workers
share the same utility function.
Though not essential for our results, we will assume that workers and ﬁrms derive zero utility
from being unmatched, and that any match is preferable to remaining unmatched for all participants.
We denote the set of all agent preference list proﬁles as   F W and let t() be the distribution
over this set. A market is given by the 5-tuple hF;W;t;u;vi:
In our model we consider block-correlated distributions of preferences. That is, ﬁrms can be
partitioned in blocks, so that all workers agree which block contains the most desirable ﬁrms, which
block the second most desirable set of ﬁrms and so on. However, within a block, workers have
idiosyncratic preferences over ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has preferences over the workers chosen uniformly,
randomly and independently from the set of all strict preference orderings over all workers.13
Deﬁnition 1. The distribution of agent preferences t() is block-correlated if there exists a partition
F1;:::;FB of the ﬁrms into blocks are such that
1. For any b < b0, where b;b0 2 f1;:::;Bg, each worker prefers every ﬁrm in block Fb to any ﬁrm
in block Fb0;
2. Each worker’s preferences within each block Fb are uniform and independent; and
3. Each ﬁrm’s preferences over workers are uniform and independent.
Block-correlated preferences are meant to capture the notion that many two-sided markets are
segmented. That is, workers may largely agree on the ranking of blocks on the other side of the
market, but vary in their preferences within each block. For example, workers might agree on the
set of ﬁrms that constitute the “top tier” of the market; however within that tier, preferences are
inﬂuenced by factors speciﬁc to each worker.
3.1 The Oﬀer Game with No Signals
In the absence of a signaling mechanism play proceeds as follows. After preferences of ﬁrms and
workers are realized, each ﬁrm simultaneously makes an oﬀer to at most one worker. Workers then
12Let  : f1;:::;Wg ! f1;:::;Wg be a permutation. Abusing notation, we apply  to preference lists, workers,
and sets of workers such that the permutation applies to the worker indices. For example, suppose W = 3; (1) = 2;
(2) = 3; and (3) = 1. Then we have f = (w1;w2;w3) ) (f) = (w2;w3;w1) and (w1) = w2.
13For tractability, we consider only correlation of worker preferences and not correlation of ﬁrm preferences, though
our intuition is that beneﬁts from signaling would extend in a model where workers are also partioned in blocks.
9choose at most one oﬀer from those available to them. Sequential rationality ensures that workers
will always select the best available oﬀer. Hence, we take the behavior in the last stage as given
and focus on the reduced game with only ﬁrms as strategic players.
Once its preference list f (f ’s type) is realized, ﬁrm f decides whether and to whom to make
an oﬀer. Firm f may use a mixed strategy denoted by f which maps the set of preference lists to
the set of distributions over the union of workers with the no-oﬀer option, denoted by N; that is
f : f ! (W [ N).14 We denote a proﬁle of all ﬁrms’ strategies as F = (f1;:::fF), and the
set of ﬁrm f’s possible strategies as f .
Let the function f : (f)
F  ! R denote the payoﬀ of ﬁrm f as a function of ﬁrm strategies
and realized agent types. We are now ready to deﬁne the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the oﬀer
game with no signals.
Deﬁnition 2. Strategy proﬁle ^ F is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the oﬀer game with no signals
if for all f 2 F and  f 2 f, the strategy ^ f maximizes the proﬁt of ﬁrm f of type  f. That is,
^ f( f) 2 argmaxf2f E f(f(f; ^  f;) j  f):
We focus on equilibria in which ﬁrm strategies are anonymous; that is, they depend only on
workers’ ranks within a ﬁrm’s preference list.15 This rules out strategies that rely on worker indices,
eliminating any coordination linked to the identity of workers. As an example, “always make an
oﬀer to my second-ranked worker” is an anonymous strategy, while “always make an oﬀer to the
worker called w2” is not.
Deﬁnition 3. Firm f’s strategy f is anonymous if for any permutation ; and for any preference
proﬁle f 2 f, we have f((f)) = (f(f)):16
3.2 The Oﬀer Game with Signals
We now modify the game so that each worker may send a “signal” to exactly one ﬁrm. A signal is
a ﬁxed message; that is, the only decision of workers is whether and to whom to send a signal. No
decision can be made about the content of the signal. Note that the signal does not directly aﬀect
the utility a ﬁrm derives from a worker, as the ﬁrm’s utility from hiring a worker is determined by
how high the ﬁrm ranks that worker. However, the signal of a worker may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s beliefs
over whether that worker is likely to accept an oﬀer. Since we have a congested market where ﬁrms
can only make one oﬀer, these beliefs may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision of whom to make an oﬀer. The
oﬀer game with signals proceeds in three stages:
14In other words, f selects elements of a W-dimensional simplex; f(f) 2 
W; where 
W = fx 2 R
W+1 : PW+1
i=1 xi = 1, and xi  0 for each ig.
15This assumption is standard in search literature (see e.g. Shimer, 2005; Kircher, 2009).
16As stated in footnote 12 we consider only permutations of the worker indices in strategy proﬁle (f(f)) and
do not permute the no-oﬀer option, i.e. (N) = N.
101. Agents’ preferences are realized. Each worker decides whether to send a signal, and to which
ﬁrm. Signals are sent simultaneously, and are observed only by ﬁrms who have received them.
2. Each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to at most one worker; oﬀers are made simultaneously.
3. Each worker accepts at most one oﬀer from the set of oﬀers she receives.
Once again, sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best available oﬀer.
Hence, we take this behavior for workers as given and focus on the reduced game consisting of the
ﬁrst two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, each worker sends a signal to a ﬁrm, or else chooses not to send a signal.
A mixed strategy for worker w is a map from the set of all possible preference lists to the set of
distributions over the union of ﬁrms and the no-signal option, denoted by N; that is, w : w !
(F [ N). In the second stage, each ﬁrm observes the set of workers that sent it a signal, WS 
W [ N, and based on these signals forms beliefs f(jWS) about the preferences of workers. Each
ﬁrm, based on these beliefs as well as its preferences, decides whether and to whom to make an oﬀer.
A mixed strategy of ﬁrm f is a map from the set of all possible preference lists, f, and the set of all
possible combinations of received signals, 2W, which is the set of all subsets of workers, to the set of
distributions over the union of workers and the no-oﬀer option. That is, f : f 2W ! (W[N).
We denote a proﬁle of all worker and ﬁrm strategies as W = (w1;:::wW ) and F = (f1;:::fF)
respectively.
The payoﬀ to ﬁrm f is a function of ﬁrm and worker strategies and realized agent types, which
we again denote as f : (w)W  (f)F   ! R. Similarly, deﬁne the payoﬀ of workers as
w : (w)W  (f)F   ! R. As the oﬀer game with signals is a multi-stage game of incomplete
information, we consider sequential equilibrium as the solution concept.
Deﬁnition 4. The strategy proﬁle ^  = (^ W; ^ F) and posterior beliefs ^ f(jWS) for each ﬁrm f
and each subset of workers WS  W [ N are a sequential equilibrium if
 for any w 2 W;  w 2 W : ^ w( w) 2 argmaxw2wE w(w(w; ^  w;) j  w);
 for any f 2 F;  f 2 f; WS  W [ N :
^ f( f;WS) 2 argmaxf2f E f(f(f; ^  f;) j  f;WS; ^ f);
where ^  a denotes the strategies of all agents except a, for a = w;f, and beliefs are deﬁned using
Bayes’ rule.17
We again focus on equilibria where agents use anonymous strategies, thereby eliminating unre-
alistic sources of coordination.
17As usual in a sequential equilibrium, permissible oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are deﬁned by considering the limits of
completely mixed strategies.
11Deﬁnition 5. Firm f’s strategy f is anonymous if for any permutation , preference proﬁle
f 2 f; and subset of workers WS  W [ N who send f a signal, we have f((f);(WS)) =
(f(f;WS)): Worker w’s strategy w is anonymous if for any permutation  that permutes only
ﬁrm orderings within blocks and any preference proﬁle w 2 w, we have w((w)) = (w(w)):18
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 The Oﬀer Game with No Signals
Let us ﬁrst consider the oﬀer game with no signals. When deciding whom to make an oﬀer, ﬁrms
must consider both the utility from hiring a speciﬁc worker and the likelihood that this worker
will accept an oﬀer. Because preferences of ﬁrms are independently and uniformly chosen from all
possible preference orderings, and since ﬁrms use anonymous strategies, an oﬀer to any worker will
be accepted with equal probability. Hence, each ﬁrm optimally makes an oﬀer to the highest-ranked
worker on its preference list. Indeed, this is the unique equilibrium when ﬁrms use anonymous
strategies.
Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium of the oﬀer game with no signals when ﬁrms use anonymous
strategies and workers accept the best available oﬀer is f(f) = 1
f for all f 2 F and f 2 f:
Note that the above statement requires that ﬁrm strategies be anonymous only in equilibrium.
Firm deviations that do not satisfy the anonymity assumption are still allowed. As seen in the
example in Section 2, in this equilibrium there might be considerable lack of coordination, leaving
many ﬁrms and workers unmatched.19
4.2 The Oﬀer Game with Signals
We now turn to the oﬀer game with signals, where we will be interested in equilibria where ﬁrms
within each block play symmetric, anonymous strategies. That is, if ﬁrm f and ﬁrm f0 belong to
the same block Fb; for some b 2 f1;:::;Bg; they play the same anonymous strategies and have the
same beliefs. We call such ﬁrm strategies and ﬁrm beliefs block-symmetric. We denote equilibria
where ﬁrm strategies and ﬁrm beliefs are block-symmetric and worker strategies are anonymous and
symmetric as block-symmetric equilibria.
Our ﬁrst step in characterizing the set of block-symmetric equilibria is to pin down the strategies
of workers, who must choose whether to send a signal, and if so, to which ﬁrm. In block-symmetric
equilibria, ﬁrms within each block use the same anonymous strategies. Hence, we can denote the ex-
ante probability of a worker w receiving an oﬀer from a ﬁrm in block Fb, conditional on w sending and
not sending a signal to it as ps
b and pns
b correspondingly. We also denote the equilibrium probability
that a worker sends her signal to a ﬁrm in block Fb as b, where b 2 [0;1] and
PB
b=1 b  1.
18As stated in footnote 12 we consider only permutations of the worker indices in (W
S) and (f(f;W
S)) and
do not permute the no-signaling and the no-oﬀer option, i.e. (N) = N.
19Note that our model of a congested market is reminiscent of the micro-foundations for the matching function in
the search literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
12The following proposition characterizes worker strategies in all block-symmetric sequential equi-
libria that satisfy a multiplayer analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987).20
Proposition 2 (Worker Strategies). Consider a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisﬁes
Criterion D1. Then either
1. Signals do not inﬂuence oﬀers: for every b 2 f1;:::;Bg, ps
b = pns
b or
2. Signals sent in equilibrium increase the chances of receiving an oﬀer: there exists b0 2
f1;:::;Bg such that ps
b0 > pns
b0 and
(a) for any b 2 f1;:::;Bg such that b > 0; we have ps
b > pns
b ; and if a worker sends her
signal to block Fb, she sends her signal to her most preferred ﬁrm within Fb, and
(b) for any b0 2 f1;:::;Bg such that b0 = 0, workers’ strategies are optimal for any oﬀ-
equilibrium beliefs of ﬁrms from block Fb0.
Proposition 2 states that there are two types of block-symmetric equilibria that satisfy Criterion
D1. Equilibria of the ﬁrst type are babbling, where ﬁrms ignore signals. The outcomes of these
equilibria coincide with the outcome in the oﬀer games with no signals. Consequently, the signaling
mechanism adds no value in this case.
In equilibria of the second type, workers send signals only to their most preferred ﬁrm in each
block, possibly mixing across these top ﬁrms (see Figure 1). It is quite natural to expect that in
equilibrium, workers may signal to multiple blocks with positive probability. Note that if all workers
were signaling to the same block, the beneﬁts to a single worker from signaling to a diﬀerent block
could be quite high.
In equilibrium workers only send signals to blocks in which ﬁrms respond to signals; that is, the
chances of receiving an oﬀer from the ﬁrm they signaled must be higher than if they had not sent
that signal. Moreover, if in equilibrium worker w is not prescribed to signal to some block Fb0, then
w’s choice of b0 = 0 is optimal for any beliefs of ﬁrms in block Fb0. In particular, this strategy
would be optimal even if ﬁrms in block Fb0 interpreted unexpected signals in the most favorable
way; i.e., upon receiving a signal from worker w, each ﬁrm f in Fb0 believes that it is w’s most
preferred ﬁrm within block Fb0.
We call strategies where workers send signals only to their most preferred ﬁrm in any block (or
mix over such ﬁrms) best-in-block strategies. We call beliefs where a ﬁrm interprets a signal from a
worker w as indicating it is the most preferred ﬁrm of w in that block best-in-block beliefs. We will
now assume that workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and that ﬁrms have best-in-block
20Criterion D1 lets us characterize beliefs when ﬁrms receive “unexpected,” or oﬀ-equilibrium, signals. See the
proof of Proposition 2 for the deﬁnition of our analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987). Other reﬁnements
could also be used in our equilibrium characterization: for example, we could replace Criterion D1 with “universal
divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) or by “never a weak best response” of Cho and Kreps (1987) without making a

















Figure 1: Signals in Block Symmetric Equilibria. In block symmetric
equilibria, a worker sending a signal may mix over multiple ﬁrms,
but these ﬁrms may include only the worker’s most preferred ﬁrm
in any block. When a ﬁrm receives a signal in equilibrium, it in-
terprets this as meaning it is the signaling worker’s most preferred
ﬁrm within the block.
beliefs, and examine ﬁrm oﬀers in the second stage of the game.21
Call f’s most preferred worker Tf (f ’s top-ranked worker). Consider a ﬁrm f that has received
signals from a subset of workers WS  W [ N. We denote jWSj be the number of received signals
and assume that jNj = 0. Call f’s most preferred worker in this subset Sf (f ’s most preferred
signaling worker). The expected payoﬀ to f from making an oﬀer to Tf or Sf (whichever yields
greater payoﬀ) is strictly greater than the payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to any other worker. This
follows from symmetry of worker strategies and block-symmetry and anonymity of ﬁrm strategies:
for any two workers who sent a signal, f’s expectation that these workers will accept an oﬀer is
identical. Hence, if f makes an oﬀer to a worker who sent a signal, it should make that oﬀer to the
worker it prefers the most among them. The same logic holds for any two workers who have not sent
a signal. (Proposition A1 in Appendix A provides a rigorous argument for the above statements).
This suggests a special kind of strategy for ﬁrms, which we will call a cutoﬀ strategy.
21Note that ﬁrms have best-in-block beliefs on the equilibrium path in any block-symmetric equilibrium. In
addition, a block-symmetric equilibrium satisﬁes Criterion D1 if and only if worker strategies remain optimal if ﬁrm
oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are best-in-block beliefs. Hence, we will focus on equilibria where ﬁrms have best-in-block
beliefs even oﬀ the equilibrium path. See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A for details.
14Deﬁnition 6 (Cutoﬀ Strategies). Strategy f is a cutoﬀ strategy for ﬁrm f if 9j1;:::;jW 2
f1;:::;Wg; such that for any f 2 f and any set WS of workers who sent a signal,
f(f;WS) =
(
Sf if rankf(Sf)  jjWSj
Tf otherwise:
We call (j1;:::;jW) f’s cutoﬀ vector, which has as its components cutoﬀs for each positive number
jWSj of received signals.
A ﬁrm f which employs a cutoﬀ strategy need only look at the rank of the most preferred worker
who sent it a signal, conditional on the number of signals f has received. If the rank of this worker
is below a certain cutoﬀ (lower ranks are better since one is the most preferred rank), then the ﬁrm
makes an oﬀer to this most preferred signaling worker Sf. Otherwise the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to
its overall top ranked worker Tf. Cutoﬀs may in general depend on the number of signals the ﬁrm
receives. This is because the number of signals received provides information about the signals the
other ﬁrms received. This in turn aﬀects the behavior of other ﬁrms and hence the optimal decision
for ﬁrm f. Note that any cutoﬀ strategy is, by deﬁnition, an anonymous strategy.
While we deﬁned cutoﬀs as integers, we can extend the deﬁnition to include all real numbers in
the range (1;W) by letting a cutoﬀ j + ; where  2 (0;1); correspond to mixing between cutoﬀ j
and cutoﬀ j + 1 with probabilities 1    and  respectively.22
Cutoﬀ strategies are not only intuitive, but they are also optimal strategies for ﬁrms. Whenever
other ﬁrms use anonymous strategies and workers signal to their most preferred ﬁrms within blocks,
for any strategy of ﬁrm f there exists a cutoﬀ strategy that provides ﬁrm f with a weakly higher
expected payoﬀ (see Proposition A2 in Appendix A). To see this, note that ﬁrm and worker
strategies are anonymous, and the probability that ﬁrm f’s oﬀer to Tf or Sf will be accepted
depends only on the number of signals ﬁrm f receives, and not on the identity of the signaling
workers. Hence, if f ﬁnds it optimal to make an oﬀer to Sf, it will certainly make an oﬀer to a
more preferred Sf, provided the number of signals it receives is the same. The equilibrium results
in this paper will all involve ﬁrms using cutoﬀ strategies.
Since cutoﬀ strategies can be represented by cutoﬀ vectors, we can impose a natural partial
order on them: ﬁrm f’s cutoﬀ strategy 0
f is greater than cutoﬀ strategy f if all cutoﬀs of 0
f are
weakly greater than all cutoﬀs of f and at least one of them is strictly greater. We say that ﬁrm
f responds more to signals than ﬁrm f0 when f is greater than f0.
We now examine how a ﬁrm should adjust its behavior in response to changes in the behavior
of opponents. We ﬁnd that responding to signals is a case of strategic complements.
Proposition 3 (Strategic Complements). Suppose workers play symmetric best-in-block strategies,
all ﬁrms use cutoﬀ strategies, and ﬁrm f uses a cutoﬀ strategy that is a best response. If one of the
other ﬁrms increases its cutoﬀs (responds more to signals), then the best response for ﬁrm f is also
to increase its cutoﬀs.
22This is equivalent to f making oﬀers to Sf when Sf is ranked better than j, randomizing between Tf and Sf
when Sf has rank exactly j, and making oﬀers to Tf otherwise.
15When other ﬁrms make oﬀers to workers who have signaled to them, it is risky for ﬁrm f to
make an oﬀer to a worker who has not signaled to it. Such a worker has signaled to another ﬁrm,
which is more inclined to make her an oﬀer. The greater this inclination on the part of the ﬁrm’s
opponents, the riskier it is for ﬁrm f to make an oﬀer to its most preferred overall worker Tf. Hence
as a response, ﬁrm f is also more inclined to make an oﬀer to its most preferred worker among those
who sent a signal, namely Sf.
The next result establishes the existence of equilibria in block correlated settings in the oﬀer
game with signals. To prove the theorem, we ﬁrst demonstrate equilibrium existence while requiring
ﬁrms to use only cutoﬀ strategies. We then invoke the optimality of cutoﬀs result to show that this
step is not restrictive.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Existence). There exists a block-symmetric equilibrium where 1) workers
play symmetric best-in-block strategies, and 2) ﬁrms play block-symmetric cutoﬀ strategies.
Observe that when there is a single block of ﬁrms, we have an even sharper characterization
of equilibria. With one ﬁrm block, an optimal strategy for each worker is to send a signal to her
most preferred ﬁrm, for any anonymous ﬁrm cutoﬀ strategies. Fixing this behavior, we may then
use the strategic complements property of Proposition 3 to cleanly apply Theorem 5 from Milgrom
and Roberts (1990). When there is a single block of ﬁrms, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in
pure cutoﬀ strategies where 1) workers signal to their most preferred ﬁrms and accept their best
available oﬀer and 2) ﬁrms use symmetric cutoﬀ strategies. Furthermore, there exist pure symmetric
equilibria with smallest and largest cutoﬀs. (See Theorem A1 in Appendix A for details).
5 Welfare Eﬀects of Introducing a Signaling Mechanism
We have analyzed the unique equilibrium in the oﬀer game with no signals, and we have studied
block-symmetric equilibria in the oﬀer game with a signaling mechanism. In this section we address
the eﬀect of introducing a signaling mechanism on the market outcome. We consider three outcome
measures: the number of matches in the market, the welfare of ﬁrms, and the welfare of workers.
For agent welfare comparisons we consider Pareto ex-ante expected utility as our criterion. The
expected welfare for a ﬁrm f and a worker w are captured by f and w respectively, where
f;w : (w)
W  (f)
F   ! R. Let the function m : (w)
W  (f)
F   ! R denote the
expected total number of matches in the market as a function of agent strategies and types.
We can now state the result regarding the eﬀect of adding a signaling mechanism to an oﬀer
game with no signals. Note that for the comparisons in the theorem to be strict, we require a block
with at least two ﬁrms where in equilibrium, workers send signals with positive probability to that
block. Without this condition, we only have weak comparisons.
Theorem 2 (Welfare). Consider any non-babbling block-symmetric equilibrium of the oﬀer game
with signals, in which there is a block Fb with at least two ﬁrms such that b > 0. Then,
16i. The expected number of matches is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of the oﬀer
game with no signals.
ii. The expected welfare of workers is strictly greater than in the unique equilibrium of the oﬀer
game with no signals.
iii. The welfare of ﬁrms may be greater or smaller than in the unique equilibrium of the oﬀer game
with no signals.
The introduction of a signaling mechanism increases the expected number of matches because
ﬁrms, by responding to signals, make oﬀers to workers who are more likely to accept them. Fur-
thermore, ﬁrms responding to signals also unambiguously increase the expected welfare of workers
because workers receive oﬀers from better ﬁrms and with higher probability.
In contrast, a ﬁrm responding to signals has a negative spillover on the welfare of other ﬁrms
in the same block. To see this, note that when a ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to a worker who has signaled
it, any other ﬁrm in the same block planning to make this worker an oﬀer because it has ranked it
highest despite not having received a signal, suddenly faces insurmountable competition. This logic
illustrates that while there is an “information eﬀect” where ﬁrms value signals which help them assess
which workers will accept oﬀers, there is a potentially counterveiling “competition eﬀect” where ﬁrm
response to signals may negatively impact the welfare of other ﬁrms. Either eﬀect can dominate,
explaining the ambiguous impact of signaling on ﬁrm welfare (recall our example in Section 2).
In a model with a single block of ﬁrms, we once again can make sharper predictions. In addition
to analyzing the eﬀect of introducing a signaling mechanism, we can also compare welfare across
signaling equilibria. When multiple symmetric equilibria exist, ﬁrms and workers are opposed in
their preferences: workers prefer the equilibrium that involves ﬁrms responding most to signals
(greatest cutoﬀs), while ﬁrms prefer the equilibrium where they respond least.
Theorem 3 (Welfare: Single Block of Firms). Consider any two symmetric cutoﬀ strategy equilibria
in the oﬀer game with signals with one block of ﬁrms where in one equilibrium ﬁrms have greater
cutoﬀs (respond more to signals). Compared to the equilibrium with lower cutoﬀs, in the equilibrium
with greater cutoﬀs we have the following: (i) the expected number of matches is weakly greater, (ii)
workers have weakly higher expected payoﬀs, and (iii) ﬁrms have weakly lower expected payoﬀs.
Note that we cannot generalize this result to block-correlated markets. When a single ﬁrm
responds more to signals, ﬁrms in lower ranked blocks may beneﬁt: a low ranked ﬁrm making an
oﬀer to a worker who has signaled it will face less competition when a higher ranked ﬁrm focuses
on a (diﬀerent) worker who has signaled it. Hence, we no longer see a purely negative spillover on
other ﬁrms.
6 Market Structure and The Value of a Signaling Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of introducing a signaling mechanism across diﬀerent market
structures. In particular, we focus our analysis on the increase in the expected number of matches
17due to the introduction of a signaling mechanism as we vary the relative size of the two sides of the
market and the number of periods of interaction.
To isolate the impact of a signaling mechanism on the number of matches in the market, we
consider a special case where agents want to match, but are nearly indiﬀerent over whom they match
with. That is, ﬁrms and workers play an (almost) pure coordination game amongst themselves.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the cardinal utility from being matched to a partner as being almost the
same across partners. If agent a has a preference proﬁle a, agent a prefers to be matched with
partner k
a; rather than with partner k0
a , k0 > k, though the diﬀerence between utility intensities is
very small.23 In addition, there is only one block of ﬁrms, so that agent preferences are uniformly
distributed.24
Under these assumptions, there is a unique non-babbling symmetric equilibrium in the oﬀer
game with signals. Each worker sends a signal to her most preferred ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm makes an
oﬀer to its most preferred worker that has signaled provided the ﬁrm receives at least one signal;
otherwise, it makes an oﬀer to its top-ranked worker (see Proposition B1).25 Proposition 1 also
applies in this setting; that is, there is a unique equilibrium of the oﬀer game with no signals.
We denote the expected number of matches in the unique equilibrium in the pure coordina-
tion model with signals and with F ﬁrms and W workers as mS(F;W), and without a signaling
mechanism as mNS(F;W). The increase in expected number of matches from the introduction
of the signaling mechanism, which we term the value of the signaling mechanism, we denote as
V (F;W)  mS(F;W)   mNS(F;W).
6.1 Balanced Markets
In this subsection, we examine how the value of the signaling mechanism changes for markets of
various sizes. We begin with an illustration. Figure 2 graphs 100  V (F;W)=W as a function of F
for ﬁxed W = 10 and W = 100; and 100  V (F;W)=F as a function of W for ﬁxed F = 10 and
F = 100. That is, the ﬁgure depicts the increase in the expected number of matches proportional to
the size of the side of the market we keep ﬁxed (which places an upper bound on the total number
of possible matches).










u(1), where u(1) and u(W) are
ﬁrm utility from matching with ﬁrst and last ranked workers, respectively. A complete speciﬁcation of the setup can
be found in Web Appendix B.2.
24Our pure coordination model has similarities to the “urn-ball” model in the labor literature, concisely described
in a survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001): “Firms play the role of urns and workers play the role of balls. An
urn becomes “productive” when it has ball in it. [...] In the simplest version of this process U workers know exactly
the location of V job vacancies and send one application each. If a vacancy receives one or more applications it selects
an applicant at random and forms a match. The other applicants are returned to the pool of unemployed workers to
apply again.” Our pure coordination model eﬀectively ﬂips the urn-ball problem around. Workers apply to all jobs,
and ﬁrms propose the oﬀers. We have a non-random selection procedure, and of course in our model we study the
role of signaling. Perhaps the paper with the closest market structure to ours is Julien, Kennes and King (2000).
25In this case, one can view the oﬀer game with no signals as the result of the ﬁrst round of a ﬁrm-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm. When workers send signals, the result resembles one round of a worker-proposing




































































Figure 2: Balanced Markets. The proportional increase in the number of
matches due to a signaling mechanism as we vary the number of
ﬁrms for a ﬁxed number of workers (left graphs) and vice versa
(right graphs).
The ﬁgures suggest that the value of a signaling mechanism is single peaked when varying one
side of the market and holding the other constant. In this example, the signaling mechanism is
most beneﬁcial for balanced markets — markets where the the number of ﬁrms and the number
of workers are roughly of the same magnitude. To understand why signaling may be particularly
useful in balanced markets, it is helpful to think about the endpoints. With many workers and very
few ﬁrms, ﬁrms will almost certainly match with or without the signaling mechanism, as there is
no large coordination problem. With many ﬁrms and few workers, the reverse holds: most workers
will get oﬀers with or without the signaling mechanism. Hence, the signaling mechanism oﬀers
little beneﬁt at the extremes. Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests that the proportional increase in the
expected number of matches remains steady as market size increases, holding constant the ratio of
workers to ﬁrms. Proposition 4 describes these observations precisely.
Proposition 4 (Balanced Markets). Consider markets with F ﬁrms and W workers. Then (i) for
ﬁxed W, V (F;W) attains its maximum value at F = x0W + OW(1), where x0  1:01211 and (ii)
for ﬁxed F, V (F;W) attains its maximum value at W = y0F + OF(1), where y0  1:8442.
The proof of Proposition 4 involves the calculation of an explicit formula for V (F;W). The
expected increase in the number of matches can be represented as









19where () and () are particular functions and OW(1) and OF(1) denote functions that are smaller
than a constant for large W and for large F respectively. Hence, V (F;W) is “almost” homogeneous
of degree one for large markets. That is, the proportional increase in the number of matches,
V (F;W)=W and V (F;W)=F, is almost homogenous of degree zero.26 As a consequence, we can
evaluate the introduction of the signaling mechanism for a sample market, and its properties will
be preserved for markets of other sizes, but with the same ratio of ﬁrms to workers.
For example, we can use Figure 2 to investigate maximal quantitative gains from the introduc-
tion of the signaling mechanism in large markets. For a ﬁxed number of workers, the maximum
increase in expected number of matches is approximately 15%. Furthermore, the returns to the
signaling mechanism are substantial over a wide range of market conditions. For example, only
when the number of ﬁrms outweighs the number of workers by more than fourfold do the gains from
introducing the signaling mechanism drop to below 1%.
6.2 Multiple Periods of Interaction
We now explore how the value of a signaling mechanism is impacted when agents can interact in
multiple periods. As in the general model, each worker can send only one signal and has only one
interview position to ﬁll. However, we now consider an oﬀer game with L+1 periods, where workers
send signals to ﬁrms in period 0, while in the other L periods agents can interact and be matched.
The exact description of the game is as follows:
Period 0: Workers send signals.
1. Agents’ preferences are realized. Each worker decides whether to send a signal and to which
ﬁrm. Signals are sent simultaneously and are observed only by ﬁrms who have received them.
Periods 1   L: Agents interact. Each period consists of two stages:
1. Each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to at most one worker; oﬀers are made simultaneously.
2. Each worker accepts at most one oﬀer from the set of oﬀers she receives, and rejects all other
oﬀers.
Oﬀers cannot be deferred, and acceptance is binding. When a worker accepts an oﬀer, the ﬁrm-
worker pair leaves the market, and this is observed by all agents. Only the unmatched agents
participate in the remaining periods. As a point of comparison, we will also be interested in the
L-period oﬀer game with no signals, which is identical to the game described above except that
period 0 is excluded. Finally, we assume a discount factor  2 (0;1) for being matched in later
periods; that is, a match in period period T reduces utility by a factor of T 1.
26Note that this result corroborates the stylized fact in the empirical labor literature that the matching function
(the expected number of matches) has a constant return to scale. See, for example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
or Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
20Under the assumptions of the pure coordination model and with a suﬃciently small discount
factor, there is no incentive to delay oﬀers or acceptances, since agents care (almost) only about
being matched. There is a unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in the oﬀer game with no signals,
where each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its most preferred worker and each worker accepts its best oﬀer
in each period. Similarly, there is a unique symmetric sequential non-babbling equilibrium in the
oﬀer game with signals. Each worker sends her signal to her most preferred ﬁrm in period 0. Each
worker accepts the best available oﬀer in each period. In any period, each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to
its most preferred worker (among those remaining in the market) who has sent it a signal, provided
such a worker exists. Otherwise the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its most preferred worker among those
still in the market (Proposition B2 in Web Appendix B.2 proves these results formally).
We may now compare the oﬀer game with and without the signaling mechanism when there are
multiple periods of interaction. Additional periods of interaction provide an opportunity for a greater
number ﬁrms and workers to be matched. Therefore, the value of the signaling mechanism decreases
as the number of periods of interaction increases. The next proposition shows this relationship
formally.
Proposition 5 (Multiple Periods). The expected increase in the number of matches from the intro-
duction of the signaling mechanism, V L(F;W), is a decreasing function of the number of periods of
interactions, L.
The eﬀect of multiple periods on the value of the signaling mechanism is intuitive: the larger the
number of periods, the lower the degree of market congestion, and the lower the value of signaling.
As a practical matter, however, this result has important limitations. The result depends crucially
on participants recognizing who has left the market, information which in practice is often only
slowly disseminated. Extending the length of a market may also simply not be feasible. Entry level
labor markets often have ﬁxed end dates, and each “period” involves a high degree of organization.
For example, adding a second ASSA meeting with interviews would likely be unpalatable to hiring
committees. Finally, extending the market length can also have the eﬀect of extending the time
it takes to make and respond to oﬀers (c.f. Roth and Xing, 1997), so that the eﬀective market
length remains short, and congestion remains. So while reducing congestion by adding periods
has theoretical promise, these limitations suggest that the value of signaling will persist even in
decentralized markets with longer timeframes.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Excessive applications by job market candidates lead to market congestion: employers must devote
resources to evaluate and pursue potential candidates, but cannot give due attention to all. Eval-
uation is further complicated because employers must assess which applicants, many of whom are
performing broad searches, are likely to ultimately accept a job oﬀer.
Consequently, applicants are often eager to convey information about their interest in particular
employers, and employers stand ready to act upon such information, if it can be deemed credible.
21However, in many markets indicating preferences is cheap, and employers may struggle to iden-
tify which preference information is sincere. This, in turn, may prevent any potential gains from
preference signaling from being realized.
In this paper we examined how a signaling mechanism can overcome this credibility problem
and improve agent welfare. In our model, workers are allowed to send a costless signal to a single
ﬁrm. While participation is free and voluntary, this mechanism nevertheless provides workers with a
means of credibly expressing preferences. In a setting where workers agree on the ranking of blocks
of ﬁrms but vary in their preferences within each block, workers will send their signal to their most
preferred ﬁrm in a block, mixing across blocks. Firms use this information as guidance, optimally
using cutoﬀ strategies to make oﬀers. We ﬁnd that on average, introducing a signaling technology
increases both the expected number of matches as well as the expected welfare of workers. The
welfare of ﬁrms, on the other hand, changes ambiguously, because ﬁrms responding more to signals
may impose a negative externality on other ﬁrms. We showed further that introducing a signaling
mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets, that is, markets in which the number of ﬁrms
and the number of workers are of roughly the same magnitude.
One path for future research would be to characterize the full set of agent preferences where
signaling is beneﬁcial. While in this paper we ﬁnd that signaling mechanisms can improve agent
welfare under a reasonably broad class of preferences, for some agent preferences signaling can worsen
outcomes. Kushnir (2012) models a high-information setting with minimal congestion where signals
disturb ﬁrms’ commonly held beliefs about workers preferences, which in turn disrupts the maximal
matching. Kushnir’s example corroborates the intuition that signals may be more useful in low
information settings than in high. Further investigation of this question could be fruitful.
Another interesting question that is beyond the scope of the current paper concerns the optimal
signaling mechanism. Providing candidates with one, or else a small number of identical signals
oﬀers a tractable approach, and participants may value its simplicity. But within the realm of
mechanisms that oﬀer candidates equal numbers of identical signals, how do we identify the optimal
number of signals, especially in light of the fact that multiple equilbria may exist? And might we
do even better?
If we expand the class of mechanisms under study, we can potentially improve performance
even more. For example, the signaling mechanism that maximizes the number of matches may be
asymmetric. Consider the example in Section 2, with two ﬁrms and two workers. In the example,
each worker had exactly one signal. If both workers have and send two signals that are identical,
outcomes are as if each had no signal. If we oﬀered each worker two distinct signals, e.g. a ‘gold’
and a ‘silver’ signal, analysis is as if they had one signal each.
Asymmetric signaling capacities, however, can generate a full matching. Suppose that one
worker has a gold signal, while the other has two silver signals. Suppose further that ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between the two workers. Then one equilibrium involves the ﬁrst worker sending its gold
signal to its preferred ﬁrm. The ﬁrm that receives the gold signal will make the signaling worker an
oﬀer, while the ﬁrm who receives no gold signal will make an oﬀer to the worker who sent a silver
22signal. Both ﬁrms and workers will always be matched.
Signaling under general preferences, optimal signaling mechanisms, and the beneﬁts from sig-
naling across market structures all oﬀer exciting areas for future research.
This work suggests that a signaling mechanism has the potential to improve outcomes in con-
gested markets. But importantly, since signaling mechanisms are free, voluntary, and built on top of
existing labor markets, these improvements come in a reasonably non-invasive manner. As opposed
to a central clearinghouse, as in the National Resident Matching Program (see e.g. Roth, 1984 and
Roth and Peranson, 1999), a centralized signaling mechanism requires much less intervention. Mar-
ket designers may ﬁnd it easier to get consensus from participants to introduce such a mechanism,
which nevertheless can oﬀer signiﬁcant beneﬁts. As such, we hope that in addition to furthering
our understanding of how labor markets work, our paper adds to the practical literature that aims
at changing and improving existing markets.
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25A Appendix
This portion of the appendix covers the proofs of the main theorems and propositions from Sections 4
and 5. We also introduce Propositions A1 and A2 as well as Theorem A1 which formalize statements
made in the text, and are building blocks for the main results. Proofs for these propositions are in
the Web Appendix.
Proposition A1 (Binary Nature of Optimal Firm Oﬀer). Suppose ﬁrms  f use anonymous strate-
gies and workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies. Consider a ﬁrm f that receives signals from
workers WS  W [N. Then the expected payoﬀ to f from making an oﬀer to Sf is strictly greater
than the payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to any other worker in WS. The expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm f
from making an oﬀer to Tf is strictly greater than the payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to any other
worker from set W=WS.
Proposition A2 (Optimality of Cutoﬀ Strategies). Suppose workers use symmetric best-in-block
strategies and ﬁrms have best-in-block beliefs. Then for any strategy f of ﬁrm f, there exists a
cutoﬀ strategy that provides f with a weakly higher expected payoﬀ than f for any anonymous
strategies  f of opponent ﬁrms  f.
Theorem A1 (Equilibrium Existence: Single Block of Firms). In the oﬀer game with signals with
single block of ﬁrms, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure cutoﬀ strategies where 1) workers
signal to their most preferred ﬁrms and accept their best available oﬀer and 2) ﬁrms use symmetric
cutoﬀ strategies. Furthermore, there exist pure symmetric equilibria with smallest and largest cutoﬀs.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with No Signals). Consider some agent preference proﬁle
 2 : We will compare two strategies for ﬁrm f given its proﬁle of preferences f: strategy f of
making an oﬀer to its top worker, and strategy 0
f of making an oﬀer to its nth ranked worker, n > 1.
We have f() = 1
f  w and 0
f() = n
f  wn: We will show that for any anonymous strategies
 f of opponent ﬁrms  f, these two strategies yield identical probabilities of f being matched, so
that f optimally makes its oﬀer to its most preferred worker. The proposition straightforwardly
follows.
Denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w and wn in a ﬁrm preference list (or proﬁle
of ﬁrm preference lists) as  : (:::;w;:::;wn;:::)  ! (:::;wn;:::;w;:::): We now construct preference
proﬁle 0 2  from  as follows:
 ﬁrm f’s preferences are the same as in  : 0
f = f;
 workers w and wn are exchanged in the preference lists of ﬁrms  f : 8f0 2  f; we have
0
f0 = (f0)
 worker w and worker wn preference proﬁles are exchanged: 0
w = wn; 0
wn = w, and
26 w0 = 
0
w0 for any other w0 2 W nfw;wng.
Deﬁne function mf : (w)
W  (f)
F   ! R as the probability of ﬁrm f being matched as a
function of agent strategies and types. Since ﬁrm  f strategies are anonymous we have
 f(0
 f) =  f(( f)) = ( f( f))
Therefore, the probability of ﬁrm f0; f0 2  f; making an oﬀer to worker w for proﬁle  equals the
probability of making an oﬀer to worker wn for proﬁle 0. Moreover, since we exchange worker w
and wn preference lists for proﬁle 0, whenever it is optimal for worker w to accept ﬁrm f oﬀer for
proﬁle ; it is optimal for worker wn to accept ﬁrm f0s oﬀer for proﬁle 0. Therefore,
mf(f; f;) = mf(0
f; f;0)
In other words, given f, for each  f there exists 0
 f such that the probability of f’s oﬀer
to 1
f being accepted when opponent preferences are  f equals the probability of f’s oﬀer to n
f
being accepted when opponent preferences are 0
 f.27 Moreover 0
 f is diﬀerent for diﬀerent  f by
construction. Since  f and 0




E mf(f; f;) = E mf(0
f; f;):
That is, the expected probability of getting a match from ﬁrm f’s top choice equals the expected
probability of getting a match from ﬁrm f’s nth ranked choice. Since the utility from obtaining a
top match is greater, the strategy of ﬁrm f of making an oﬀer to its top worker is optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (Worker Strategies). We ﬁrst deﬁne an analog of criterion D1 of Cho
and Kreps for our setting.28 Consider some block-symmetric sequential equilibrium. Fix strategies
of all agents except worker w and ﬁrm f; which we denote as  f;w. Fix also the beliefs of ﬁrms
other than ﬁrm f, which we denote as  f. We now analyze strategies of worker w and strategies
and beliefs for ﬁrm f.
There are two cases where information sets for ﬁrms might be reached with zero probability (lie
“oﬀ the equilibrium path”) in a block-symmetric equilibrium. First, when the symmetric worker
equilibrium strategy prescribes zero probability of sending a signal to a particular block, ﬁrms in
these blocks would view signals from such workers as “unexpected.” Second, when a ﬁrm antici-
pates receiving a signal with 100% probability, then not receiving a signal would correspond to an
oﬀ-equilibrium information set. But by the anonymous strategies assumption, this can only happen
in a block-symmetric equilibrium if the ﬁrm is the only one in its block. In this case, the symmetry
27In this context,  f is a preference proﬁle for all agents – both workers and ﬁrms – other than f.
28See Cho and Kreps (1987) for the original deﬁnition.
27of worker strategies would ensure that all workers send their signals to this ﬁrm with probability
1. Since signals then would not transmit information about worker types, this equilibrium is out-
come equivalent to a babbling equilibrium. We will concentrate on the ﬁrst type of oﬀ-equilibrium
messages – “unexpected” signals.
Consider ﬁrm f’s decision at an information set that includes a (hypothetical, oﬀ-equilibrium)
signal from worker w. Denote the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of ﬁrm f as u
f and the expected
equilibrium payoﬀ of worker w as u
w. For each possible type   2 f for ﬁrm f and each set of
signals that ﬁrm f could receive, we denote the mixed best response of ﬁrm f that has beliefs   as
MBRf( ;WS [ w;  ) = argmaxf2f E f(f(f; f;) j f =  ; WS
f = WS [ w; f =  ):
We then denote the mixed best response of ﬁrm f for all possible types and all possible proﬁles of
signals it may receive conditional on receiving worker w’s signal as
MBRf(w;  ) = fMBRf( ;WS [ w;  ) for all   2 f; WS  W [ Ng:









Denote for any worker’s type t 2 w
Dt = f 2 MBRf(w;w) : u
w(t) < E w(w(w;; w;f;) j w = t)g
D0
t = f 2 MBRf(w;w) : u
w(t) = E w(w(w;; w;f;) j w = t)g:
Intuitively, set Dt (D0
t) is the set of ﬁrm f strategies (consistent with f best responding to strategies
of ﬁrms  f and to some set of beliefs that places weight 1 on w signaling f) such that by signaling
f, worker w of type t would receive an expected payoﬀ greater than (equal to) her equilibrium
payoﬀ. We say that type t may be pruned from ﬁrm f’s beliefs if ﬁrm f’s oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs
place zero probability on worker w being type t (upon f receiving a signal from her). Using the
above notation, we now state our analog of criterion D1 as follows:
Criterion D1. Fix strategies of workers  w and strategies and beliefs of ﬁrms  f. If for some
type t 2 w of worker w there exists a second type t0 2 w with Dt [ D0
t  Dt0, then t may
be pruned from the domain of ﬁrm f’s beliefs.
The intuition behind this criterion is that whenever type t of worker w either wishes to defect and
send an oﬀ-equilibrium signal to ﬁrm f or is indiﬀerent, some other type t0 of worker w strictly
wishes to defect. When we prune t for w from ﬁrm f’s beliefs, we are interpreting that ﬁrm f ﬁnds
it inﬁnitely more likely that the oﬀ-equilibrium signal has come from type t0 than from type t:
We ﬁrst show that there cannot be a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisﬁes Cri-
terion D1 where sending a signal to a ﬁrm in some block Fb; b 2 f1;:::;Bg reduces the likelihood of
28receiving an oﬀer, i.e. ps
b < pns
b .
Let us assume that such a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium exists. If there are at least two
workers, agents use anonymous block-symmetric strategies, and agents’ types are uncorrelated, each
worker is unmatched with positive probability. Then in equilibrium, certainly no worker sends her
signal to a ﬁrm within block Fb; she’d prefer to simply send no signal at all. Hence, it must be that
a signal would reduce the probability of an oﬀer for ﬁrms in some block not signaled in equilibrium.
Following the deﬁnition of Dt, whenever it would be beneﬁcial for some type w 2 w to deviate
from the equilibrium path and send her signal to ﬁrm f (which would require ﬁrm f making an
oﬀer to worker w), then it would be beneﬁcial for any type 0
w 2 w of worker w such that ﬁrm f is
w’s most preferred ﬁrm within block Fb, to similarly deviate. Therefore, the only types (preference
proﬁles) of worker w that are not pruned in ﬁrms’ beliefs according to Criterion D1 are those where
ﬁrm f is w’s most preferred ﬁrm within block Fb. Hence, given these beliefs, if it is optimal for ﬁrm
f to make an oﬀer to worker w when it does not receive a signal from her, it is optimal for ﬁrm f
to make an oﬀer to worker w when it receives her signal. This contradicts our initial assumption,
and hence ps
b0 < pns
b0 cannot be part of any block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisﬁes
Criterion D1.
We have established that ps
b  pns
b for each b = 1;:::;B. It is easy to observe that there exists
a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisﬁes Criterion D1 where for any b = 1;:::;B;
ps
b = pns
b . For example, each worker may randomize her signal across all ﬁrms with equal probability,
independently of her preferences, and ﬁrms simply play the equilibrium strategies of the oﬀer game
with no signals. The equilibrium beliefs are trivially block-uniform since when a ﬁrm receives a
signal from worker w, its beliefs coincide with the priors. Since all blocks are reached with positive
probability in equilibrium, no oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs need be speciﬁed, and the equilibrium trivially
satisﬁes Criterion D1.
Let us now consider the case when there exists b0 2 f1;:::;Bg; such that ps
b0 > pns
b0 in some
block-symmetric sequential equilibrium. Recall that the equilibrium probability that a worker sends
her signal to a ﬁrm within block Fb is denoted as b; where b 2 [0;1] and
PB
b=1 b  1. Let
us consider some block Fb(6= Fb0) such that b > 0. As mentioned, if there are at least two
workers, agents use anonymous block-symmetric strategies, and agents’ types are uncorrelated,
each worker is unmatched with positive probability in equilibrium. Therefore, b > 0 and ps
b = pns
b
are incompatible in an equilibrium (worker w can beneﬁt by signaling to block Fb0 rather than block
Fb). Hence, if ps
b > pns
b then if worker w plans to send a signal to a ﬁrm in Fb, it should be to her
most preferred ﬁrm within this block, as this delivers the greatest expected payoﬀ to her.
Now suppose there is some block Fb0, b0 2 f1;:::;Bg; such that b0 = 0: Consider the decision of
some ﬁrm f 2 Fb0 at an information set that includes a (hypothetical, oﬀ-equilibrium) signal from
worker w. We have two cases: either there exists type t 2 w of worker w such that Dt 6= ?, or
else for any type t 2 w, Dt = ?.
We will ﬁrst rule out the former case. Suppose there exists type t 2 w of worker w such that
Dt 6= ?: That is, if worker w sends a signal to ﬁrm f, there exists a “reasonable” ﬁrm f strategy
29that delivers expected payoﬀ to worker w of type t greater than her equilibrium payoﬀ. However,
any ﬁrm f oﬀer that delivers payoﬀ exceeding equilibrium payoﬀ for worker w of type t, also delivers
payoﬀ exceeding equilibrium payoﬀ for a worker w of type t0 which prefers ﬁrm f to any other ﬁrm
in block Fb0. Therefore, the only ﬁrm f oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs that survive Criterion D1 are such
that
f(fw 2 w : f = max
w
(f0 2 Fb0)gjw  WS
f ) = 1: (A.0.1)
But since Dt0 and D0
t0 consist of ﬁrm f best responses, it is optimal for ﬁrm f to indeed make
an oﬀer to worker w upon receiving her signal, provided f’s beliefs are restricted to (A.0.1). This
means that the equilibrium strategy of worker w of type t0 (not sending a signal to ﬁrm f) is not
optimal if ﬁrm f has beliefs (A.0.1). Therefore, there cannot exist type t 2 w of worker w such
that Dt 6= ?.
Let us now consider the case where for any type t 2 w, we have Dt = ?. That is, it is
never beneﬁcial for any type of worker to send an oﬀ-equilibrium signal, as no reasonable oﬀers
can be expected for any ﬁrm beliefs. Therefore, b0 = 0 is an equilibrium strategy for worker w
independently of oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of ﬁrm f. In particular, worker w’s strategy is optimal for
any oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of ﬁrms in block Fb0, even if each ﬁrm f has the most favorable possible
beliefs about worker w, such as in (A.0.1).
Note that if there are at least two workers, the interaction between worker w and some ﬁrm f
(ﬁxing the strategies and beliefs of other agents) is a monotonic signaling game of Cho and Sobel
(1990). The assumption of monotonicity is satisﬁed in our environment because each type of worker
w prefers the same action of ﬁrm f, i.e. ﬁrm f making an oﬀer to worker w. As a consequence,
Criterion D1 is equivalent to “never a weak best response” of Cho and Kreps (1987) and “universal
divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) in our setting. More detailed discussion of monotonic signaling
games can be found in Cho and Sobel (1990). 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Strategic Complements). Consider some ﬁrm f from some block Fb;
b 2 f1;:::;Bg: We consider two strategy proﬁles,  f and 0
 f, for ﬁrms  f that vary only in the
strategy for ﬁrm f0 . For simplicity, we assume that 0
f0 diﬀers from f0 only for some proﬁle  f0
and some set of received signals WS
f0
f0( f0;WS
f0) = Sf0 + (1   )Tf0
0
f0( f0;WS
f0) = 0Sf0 + (1   0)Tf0
such that 0 > . Formally, this means 0
f is not a cutoﬀ strategy, because a cutoﬀ strategy requires
the same behavior for any proﬁle of preferences (anonymity) when ﬁrms receive the same number
of signals. We will prove the statement using our simplifying assumption about strategies for ﬁrms
 f, and the extension to the full proposition follows from iterated application of this result.
Consider some realized ﬁrm f preference proﬁle 
f 2  and some set of signals WS  W [ N.
We want to show that ﬁrm f’s payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to Tf (weakly) decreases whereas ﬁrm
30f’s payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to Sf (weakly) increases when ﬁrm f0 responds more to signals, i.e.
plays strategy 0
f0 instead of f0. That is,
I) E(f(Tf; f;)jf = 
f;WS




II) E(f(Sf; f;)jf = 
f;WS




Since ﬁrm f’s oﬀer can only be either accepted or declined, the above statements are equivalent to
I) E(mf(Tf; f;)jf = 
f;WS




II) E(mf(Sf; f;)jf = 
f;WS




That is, we wish to show that the probability of being matched to Tf weakly decreases, and the
probability of being matched to Sf weakly increases.
We prove I) ﬁrst. Deﬁne the sets of agent proﬁles that lead to the increase and decrease in the
probability of getting a match given the change in ﬁrm f0 strategy as
 +  f 2 jf = 
f;WS
f = WS and mf(Tf; f;) < mf(Tf;0
 f;)g
    f 2 jf = 
f;WS
f = WS and mf(Tf; f;) > mf(Tf;0
 f;)g
correspondingly. If set  + is empty, the statement has been proved. Otherwise, select arbitrary
 2  + and denote Tf  w. Since in this case, f0’s strategy change pivotally reduces competition
to f’s oﬀer to w, we must have Tf0( f0;WS
f0) = w and Sf0( f0;WS
f0) = w0 6= w, and
f0( f0;WS
f0) = w0 + (1   )w
0
f0( f0;WS
f0) = 0w0 + (1   0)w:
Note that it cannot be that ﬁrm f is from a higher ranked block than ﬁrm f0 , i.e. f0 2 Fb0 where
b0 > b. If f were from a higher ranked block, an oﬀer from ﬁrm f0 is always worse than the oﬀer
of ﬁrm f and could not inﬂuence the probability that ﬁrm f obtains a match. Therefore, ﬁrm f is
from a block that is weakly worse than Fb0, i.e. b0  b.
Note that under , worker w has sent a signal neither to ﬁrm f nor to ﬁrm f0. This will allow
us to construct element 0 2   : Consider a permutation that changes the ranks of w and w0 in a
ﬁrm preference proﬁle  : (:::;w;:::w0;:::)  ! (:::;w0;:::w;:::). For any proﬁle  2  + we construct




 the ranks of workers w and w0 are exchanged in the preference lists of ﬁrms  f: for each ﬁrm
f0 2  f; 0
f0 = (f0)
 worker w and worker w0 preference proﬁles are exchanged: 0
w = w0; 0
w0 = w, and
 for any other w0 2 Wnfw;w0g, w0 = 
0
w0.
31Note that under  and 0, ﬁrm f has the same preferences 
f and receives the same set of signals.
Since ﬁrm strategies are anonymous we have that
f0(0
f0;WS0
f0 ) = f0((f0);(WS
f0)) (by our construction)
= (w0) + (1   )(w) (by anonymity)





f0 ) = 0w + (1   0)w0:
We will now argue that 0 2   : Since  2  +, the strategy change for ﬁrm f0 reduces the
likelihood of ﬁrm f being matched with worker w (when f makes Tf an oﬀer under proﬁle ).
Under proﬁle 0, ﬁrm f0 makes an oﬀer to worker w more frequently when using strategy 0
f0 rather
than f0: Furthermore, worker w prefers ﬁrm f0 to ﬁrm f under proﬁle 0. (We have already shown
that f0 cannot be in a lower ranked block than f. If ﬁrm f0 is in a higher ranked block Fb0, b > b0;
worker w always prefers ﬁrm f0 to ﬁrm f. If ﬁrm f and ﬁrm f0 are from the same block, b = b0,
worker w prefers f to f0, since worker w sends a signal to ﬁrm f0 under proﬁle 0).
To ﬁnish our proof, we must also investigate the behavior of a ﬁrm that receives worker w’s
signal for proﬁle ; say ﬁrm fy. If ﬁrm fy makes an oﬀer to worker w for proﬁle ; since the change
of ﬁrm f0 strategy changes ﬁrm f’s payoﬀ, ﬁrm fy must be lower ranked than both ﬁrms f and f0
in worker w’s preferences. Hence, ﬁrm fy’s oﬀer cannot change the action of worker w. If worker w0
sends her signal to ﬁrm fy then ﬁrm fy either makes an oﬀer to worker w0 or to worker Tfy, which
are both diﬀerent from worker w:
Hence, ﬁrm fy does not inﬂuence the behavior of the agents in question, and the overall prob-
ability that ﬁrm f’s oﬀer to worker w is accepted is smaller when ﬁrm f0 uses strategy 0
f0 rather
than f0. That is, 0 2   :
Note that the above construction gives diﬀerent proﬁles in  + for diﬀerent proﬁles of   . Hence,








.29 Since proﬁles  and 0
are equally likely, we have
E(mf(Tf; f;)jf = 
f;WS




We now prove inequality II). That is, we will show that if ﬁrm f0 responds more to signals,
the probability of ﬁrm f being matched to Sf (upon making Sf an oﬀer) weakly increases. If ﬁrm
f; f 2 Fb; receives a signal from worker w it believes it is the best ﬁrm in block Fb according to
worker w’s preferences. That is, worker w prefers the oﬀer of ﬁrm f to an oﬀer from any other ﬁrm
f0 from any block Fb0 with b0  b. Therefore, the change of the behavior of any ﬁrm f0 from block
Fb0, b0  b; does not inﬂuence ﬁrm f’s payoﬀ.
If we consider some ﬁrm f0 from group Fb0, b0 < b; it can draw away worker w’s oﬀer from ﬁrm
29One may show by example that this is not, in general, a bijection.
32f only if it makes an oﬀer to worker w. However, ﬁrm f0 makes an oﬀer to worker w, conditionally
on ﬁrm f receiving a signal from worker w, only when worker w is Tf0: However, if ﬁrm f0 responds
more to signals, it makes an oﬀer to its Tf more rarely. This means that ﬁrm f0 draws worker








As a corollary of I) and II), if ﬁrm f0 increases its cutoﬀ point for some set of signals, ﬁrm f will
also optimally (weakly) increase its cutoﬀ points. The above logic is valid for the change of cutoﬀ
points for any set of signals of the same size and any proﬁle of preferences, so the statement of the
proposition immediately follows. 
Proof of Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Existence). We ﬁrst prove the theorem while requiring that
ﬁrms use cutoﬀ strategies and have best-in-block beliefs, and that workers use best-in-block strate-
gies. We then show that this assumption is not restrictive. Denote a typical such strategy proﬁle
as  = (F;W) that consists of ﬁrm cutoﬀ strategies F = (f1;:::;fF) and worker best-in-block
strategies strategies W = (w1;:::;wW).
Denote by Uw(w; w) the expected payoﬀ of worker w when she uses best-in-block strategy w
and the other agents use strategies  w. Denote by Uf(f; f) the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm f when
it uses strategy f and the other agents use strategies  f. Note that Uw and Uf are continuous,
as ﬁrms and workers mix over a ﬁnite set of strategies.
Denote ﬁrm f’s best reply correspondence by gf, which maps each strategy proﬁle  to the set
of mixed strategies that maximize ﬁrm f’s payoﬀ when opponents (ﬁrms and workers included)
play  f: Denote the analogous best reply correspondence for worker w as gw: Recall that agent
preferences are block-symmetric. Hence, if gf() is the set of best reply strategies to some block-
symmetric proﬁle  for ﬁrm f, it is the set of best reply strategies for any ﬁrm from the same block.
Similarly, if gw() is the set of best reply strategies to some block-symmetric proﬁle ; it is the
set of best reply strategies for any worker. Hence, we will consider the best reply correspondence
from the set of block-symmetric proﬁles to the set of block symmetric proﬁles, denoted by g =
(gf1;:::gfF;gw1;:::gwW), where if f and f0 are from the same block then gf = gf0 and for any w and
w0, we have gw = gw0.
We now invoke Kakutani’s theorem (Kakutani, 1941) to establish the existence of a block-
symmetric equilibrium. Note ﬁrst that the set of block-symmetric mixed-strategy proﬁles is a
compact, convex, and nonempty subset of a ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space. Since the arguments
of g are mixed strategies, we have that g is nonempty and convex over all block-symmetric proﬁles
 (see e.g. the logic in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.29-30). The ﬁnal condition we need to apply
Kakutani’s theorem is that g has a closed graph. By way of contradiction, assume g does not have a
closed graph, so that there is a sequence (n; ^ n) ! (; ^ ) such that n and ^ n are block-symmetric
and ^ n 2 g(n), but ^  = 2 g(). Then there exists i 2 F [ W such that ^ i = 2 gi(). Hence, we can
33ﬁnd " and 0
i such that Ui(0
i; i) > Ui(^ i; i)+3". Since Ui is continuous and (n; ^ n) ! (; ^ ),




i; i)   " > Ui(^ i; i) + 2" > Ui( ^ n
i;n
 i) + ";
which is a contradiction to ^ n
i being a best reply to n. Hence, g has a closed graph and we can
apply Kakutani’s theorem to establish the existence of a ﬁxed point of g.
Until now we have required cutoﬀ strategies and best-in-block beliefs for ﬁrms, and best-in-block
strategies for workers. Consider any block-symmetric proﬁle of strategies that is a ﬁxed point of g.
Since ﬁrms use block-symmetric strategies in this proﬁle, Proposition 2 allows us to conclude that
best-in-block strategies are optimal for workers even if we expanded the worker strategy space to
include all strategies. Since workers use best-in-block strategies for this proﬁle, ﬁrms holding best-
in-block beliefs is indeed consistent. Finally, by Proposition A2 we see that ﬁrm cutoﬀ strategies are
optimal even if we allow any ﬁrm deviations, not simply deviations in cutoﬀ strategies. Hence, we
have established the existence of an equilibrium when workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies
and ﬁrms use symmetric cutoﬀ strategies and have best-in-block beliefs. 
Proof of Theorem 2 (Welfare). We will use following lemma, proved in the Web Appendix B.
Lemma A1 (Incremental welfare). Assume ﬁrms use cutoﬀ strategies and workers use best-in-block
strategies. Fix the strategies of ﬁrms  f as  f. Let ﬁrm f’s strategy f diﬀer from 0
f only in that
0




Let us denote ﬁrm strategies in the unique equilibrium of the oﬀer game with no signals as 0
F.
Now consider a block-symmetric equilibrium of the oﬀer game with signals when agent use strategies
(F;W). If agents employ strategies (0
F;W), the expected number of matches and the welfare of
workers equal the corresponding parameters in the oﬀer game with no signals. Therefore, the result
that the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers in a block-symmetric
equilibrium in the oﬀer game with signals are weakly greater than the corresponding parameters in
the unique equilibrium of the oﬀer game with no signals is a consequence of sequential application
of Lemma A1.
Let us now consider a non-babbling block-symmetric equilibrium (F;W) of the oﬀer game
with signals such that there exists block Fb with at least two ﬁrms where b > 0. Proposition 2
shows that ﬁrms from block Fb respond to signals in the equilibrium, i.e. make oﬀers to signaling
workers with positive probability, so that ps
b > pns
b .
Select some ﬁrm f from block Fb. Using a construction similar to that in the proof of Lemma
A1 we consider two sets of preference proﬁles:
 +  f 2 j m(0
f; f;) < m(f; f;)g
    f 2 j m(0
f; f;) > m(f; f;)g:
34Consider some realized proﬁle of preferences,  2 ; and denote Tf = w0 and Sf = w. Deﬁne
mapping   :  !  so that  () is the proﬁle in which workers have preferences as in , but ﬁrms
 f all swap the positions of workers w0 and w in their preference lists. Note that  ( ()) =  and
  is a bijection on . The proof of of Lemma A1 establishes that j +j  j  j and that for any
 2   ;  () 2 . Let us now show that the inequality is actually strict, i.e. there exist  2  +
such that  () = 2   .
There are at least two ﬁrms, f and f0, in block Fb that respond to signals. Consider some proﬁle
 from  +. We again denote Tf = w0 and Sf = w. Therefore, worker w does not have an oﬀer from
any other ﬁrm for proﬁle  from  +, but worker w0 has at least two oﬀers. Since worker w0 sends
her signal to ﬁrm f0 with positive probability and ﬁrm f0 responds to signals, i.e. makes oﬀers to
its top signaling workers, there exist  2  + such that worker w0 is the top signaling worker of
ﬁrm f0, and ﬁrm f0 makes an oﬀer to worker w0.
However, worker w for proﬁle  () does not have any other oﬀer, because she is neither Tf nor
Sf for proﬁle  (). Therefore,  () cannot belong to   . Therefore, we have found a proﬁle from
 + that does not belong to   . As a result, j +j > j  j and we have that
E[m(0
f; f;)] < E[m(f; f;)]:
In addition, we know that E[m(0
f;0
 f;)]  E[m(0




Overall, the expected number of matches in the oﬀer game with signals when agents use strategies
(F;W) is strictly greater than the expected number of matches in the oﬀer game with no signals.
Using the above construction and the logic of the proof of Lemma A1 we obtain the result for
worker welfare. The example presented in Section 2 illustrates that signals can ambiguously inﬂuence
the welfare of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, Table 2 shows that ﬁrm welfare increases upon introduction of
a signaling mechanism only if the value of a second ranked worker is suﬃciently high, in this case
when x > 0:5: 
Proof of Theorem 3 (Welfare: Single Block of Firms). We ﬁrst consider any strategy proﬁle in
which ﬁrms use cutoﬀ strategies, workers send signals to their most preferred ﬁrms, and workers
accept their best available oﬀer. Fix the strategies of all ﬁrms but f as  f. Let ﬁrm f’s strategy
0
f diﬀer from f only in that 0
f responds more to signals, that is, has higher cutoﬀs than f.
Lemma A1 shows that the expected number of matches and the expected payoﬀ of each worker
w increases if ﬁrm f responds more to signals, i.e. 1)E[m(0
f; f;)]  E[m(f; f;)] and
2)E[w(0
f; f;)]  E[w(f; f;)].
Let us now show that ﬁrm f responding more to signals generates a negative spillover on oppo-
nent ﬁrms. That is, for each f0 2  f,
3) E[f0(0
f; f;)]  E[f0(f; f;)]
35Let ﬁrm f strategy f diﬀer from 0
f in that 0
f has weakly greater cutoﬀs. Consider some
ﬁrm f0 2  f. For each preference list f0 and set of signals received WS, ﬁrm f0 either makes
an oﬀer to Sf0(f0;WS) or Tf0(f0;WS). Observe that a change in strategy of ﬁrm f does not
aﬀect f0’s payoﬀ from making Sf0 an oﬀer. This follows since each worker sends her signal to her
most preferred ﬁrm, so oﬀers to signaling workers are always accepted. However, as shown in the
proof of Proposition 3, the probability that Tf0 accepts ﬁrm f0’s oﬀer weakly decreases. Hence,
overall the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm f0 2  f weakly decreases when ﬁrm f responds more to signals:
E(f0(f; f;))  E(f0(0
f; f;)):
That the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers are higher in the
equilibrium with higher cutoﬀs is a straightforward consequence of iterated application of the
ﬁrst and the second results above. In order to show that ﬁrms have lower expected payoﬀs in
the equilibrium with greater cutoﬀs, we combine the third result with a simple equilibrium prop-
erty. Consider two symmetric equilibria, where ﬁrms play cutoﬀ strategies  and 0, with 0  .
From the deﬁnition of an equilibrium strategy we have E[f(f; f;)]  E[f(0
f; f;)]:
The third result yields E[f(0
f; f;)]  E[f(0
f;0




36B Web Appendix: Proofs and Extensions.
B.1 Proofs of supplementary results.
This subsection provides proofs for Theorem A1, Propositions A1, A2, and Lemma A1.
Proof of Proposition A1 (Binary nature of ﬁrm optimal oﬀer). Consider ﬁrm f from some block
Fb; b 2 f1;:::;Bg that has realized preference proﬁle  2 f and that receives signals from the set
of workers WS  W [ N: Denote worker Sf as w and select arbitrary other worker w0 2 WS. We
ﬁrst prove that the expected payoﬀ to f from making an oﬀer to worker w is strictly greater than
the expected payoﬀ from making an oﬀer to worker w0. We denote the strategies of ﬁrm f that
correspond to these actions as f(;WS) = w and 0
f(;WS) = w0.
Workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and ﬁrms have best-in-block beliefs. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrm f believes that it is the top ﬁrm within bloc k Fb in the preference lists of workers w and w0.
Denote the set of all possible agents’ proﬁles consistent with ﬁrm f beliefs as30
   f 2 jf =  and f = max
w
(f0 2 Fb0) for each w 2 WSg
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w and w0
in a ﬁrm preference list (or proﬁle of ﬁrm preference lists) as  : (:::;w;:::w0;:::) ! (:::;w0;:::w;:::).
We now construct preference proﬁle 0 2  from  as follows:
 ﬁrm f’s preferences are the same as in : 0
f = ;
 workers w and w0 are exchanged in the preference lists of ﬁrms  f : 8f0 2  f; we have
0
f0 = (f0),
 worker w and worker w0 preference proﬁles are exchanged 0
w = w0; 0
w0 = w, and
 for any other w0 2 Wnfw;w0g, w0 = 0
w0.
Since ﬁrm f ’s preference list is unchanged and since w,w02 WS, proﬁle 0 belongs to  . Since
strategies of ﬁrms  f are anonymous, then for any f0 2  f and for any WS








Worker w and w0 send their signals to ﬁrm f under both proﬁle  and 0. Therefore, they do not
30For the case of one block of ﬁrms, ﬁrm f beliefs also exclude preference proﬁles where ﬁrm f is a top ﬁrm for
those workers that did not send signal to ﬁrm f:
   f 2 jf = 
, f = max
w
(f
0 2 Fb0) for each w 2 W
S; and f 6= maxw(f
0 2 Fb0) for each w 2 WnW
Sg:
For simplicity, we assume that there are at least two blocks. All the derivations are also valid without change for the
case of one block.
37send their signals to ﬁrms  f, i.e. (WS
f0) = WS
f0: Since 0









This means that the probability of ﬁrm f0 making an oﬀer to worker w for proﬁle  equals the
probability of making an oﬀer to worker w0 for proﬁle 0. Moreover, since we exchange worker w
and w0 preference lists for proﬁle 0, whenever it is optimal for worker w to accept ﬁrm f0s oﬀer
under proﬁle ; it is optimal for worker w0 to accept an oﬀer from ﬁrm f0 under proﬁle 0. Since
ﬁrm types are independent, the probability of ﬁrm f being matched when it uses strategy f for
proﬁle  equals the probability of ﬁrm f being matched when it uses strategy 0
f for proﬁle 0, i.e.
mf(f; f;) = mf(0
f; f;0).
Therefore, for each  2   there exists 0 2   such that the probability that ﬁrm f gets an oﬀer
from worker w equals the probability that ﬁrm f gets an oﬀer from worker w0. Moreover, proﬁle 0
is diﬀerent for diﬀerent  by our construction. Since  and 0 are equally likely,
Emf(f; f;j 2  ) = Emf(0
f; f;j 2  ):
Therefore, the expected probability that ﬁrm f gets a match if it makes an oﬀer to some worker in
WS is the same across all workers in WS. But within this set, a match with Sf oﬀers the greatest
utility, so the expected payoﬀ to f from making an oﬀer to Sf is strictly greater than the payoﬀ
from making an oﬀer to any other worker in WS.
A similar construction is valid for the workers in set WnWS. That is, the probability that ﬁrm
f’s oﬀer is accepted is the same across all workers in WnWS. Hence, ﬁrm f prefers making an oﬀer
to its most valuable worker, Tf, than to any other worker in WnWS.31 
Proof of Proposition A2 (Optimality of Cutoﬀ Strategies). If workers use best-in-block strategies
and ﬁrms have best-in-block beliefs, the optimal choice of ﬁrm f for each set of received signals is
either Sf or Tf (or some lottery between them) (see Proposition A1). In light of this, we break the
proof into two parts. First we show that the identities of workers that have sent a signal to ﬁrm f
inﬂuence neither the expected payoﬀ of making an oﬀer to Sf nor the expected payoﬀ of making an
oﬀer to Tf, conditional on the total number of signals received by f remaining constant. Second we
prove that if it is optimal for ﬁrm f to choose Sf when it receives signals from some set of workers;
then it still optimal for ﬁrm f to choose Sf if the number of received signals does not change and
Sf has a smaller rank (Sf is more valuable to f).
Let us consider some ﬁrm f from block Fb; b 2 f1;:::;Bg and some realization  of its preference
list. Assume that it is optimal for ﬁrm f to make an oﬀer to Sf if it receives a set of signals
WS  W [ N. We want to show that if ﬁrm f receives the set of signals WS0








, it is still optimal for ﬁrm f to make an oﬀer to Sf: For simplicity,
31It is certainly possible that Tf = Sf. In this case the statement of the proposition is still valid. Firm f believes
that it is Tf’s top ﬁrm within block Fb and ﬁrm f prefers making an oﬀer to Tf = Sf rather than to any other worker
in W.
38we only consider the case when WS and WS0
diﬀer only in one signal. (The general case then follows
straightforwardly.) That is, there exist worker w and worker w0 such that w belongs to set WS,
but not to set WS0
; while w0 belongs to WS0
, but not to WS. We consider two ﬁrm f strategies for
realization of signals WS and WS0
:
f(;) = Sf(;); 0
f(,)=Tf(,).
We denote the set of possible agents’ proﬁles that are consistent with ﬁrm f having received signals
from WS and WS0
as32
 S  f 2 jf =  and f = max
w
(f0 2 Fb0) for each w 2 WSg
 S0
 f 2 jf =  and f = max
w
(f0 2 Fb0) for each w 2 WS0
g
correspondingly. We now construct a bijection between  S and  S0
. Denote a permutation that
changes the ranks of w and w0 in a ﬁrm preference proﬁle as  : (:::;w;:::w0;:::)  ! (:::;w0;:::w;:::).
For any proﬁle  2  S we construct proﬁle 0 2  as follows:
 ﬁrm f preferences are the same as in : 0
f = ;
 the ranks of workers w and w0 are exchanged in the preference lists of ﬁrms  f: 8f0 2
 f; 0
f = (f);
 the preference lists of worker w and worker w0 are exchanged: 0
w = w0; 0
w0 = w; and
 for any other w0 2 Wnfw;w0g, w0 = 
0
w0.
Since this construction leaves the preference list of ﬁrm f unchanged, and since workers w and
w0 swap preference lists, we have that if  2  S, then 0 2  S0
. By construction, proﬁle 0 is
diﬀerent for diﬀerent . Finally, since the cardinality of sets  S and  S0
are the same, the above
correspondence is a bijection.
Since ﬁrm  f strategies are anonymous, for any f0 2  f and WS








This means that the probability of ﬁrm f0 making an oﬀer to worker w for any proﬁle  equals the
probability of ﬁrm f0 making an oﬀer to worker w0 for corresponding proﬁle 0. Moreover, since
we exchange worker w and w0 preference lists for proﬁle 0, whenever it is optimal for worker w to
accept ﬁrm f oﬀer for proﬁle ; it is optimal for worker w0 to accept ﬁrm f0s oﬀer for proﬁle 0.
Since ﬁrms types are independent, the probability of ﬁrm f being matched when it uses strategy
f(;) for proﬁle  equals the probability of ﬁrm f being matched when it uses strategy f(;)
for proﬁle 0:
mf(f; f;) = mf(f; f;0):
32See footnote 30 for the deﬁnition of ﬁrm beliefs for the case of one block.
39Similarly, for strategy 0
f(;) we have mf(0
f; f;) = mf(0
f; f;0). Since our construction is
a bijection between  S and  S0
, and since  and 0 are equally likely, we have
Emf(f; f;j 2  S) = Emf(f; f;0 j0 2  S0
)
Emf(0
f; f;j 2  S) = Emf(0
f; f;0 j0 2  S0
):
Therefore, if ﬁrm f optimally makes an oﬀer to Sf (Tf) when it has received set of signals WS,
it also should optimally make an oﬀer to Sf (Tf), which is the same worker, for the set of signals
WS0
.
We now prove that if ﬁrm f optimally chooses Sf(;WS) when it receives signals from WS,
then it should still optimally choose Sf(;WS0
) for set of signals WS0
, if the number of received







) has a smaller rank, that is, when the signaling
worker is more valuable to f. We consider set WS0
that diﬀers from WS only in the best (for ﬁrm
f) worker and the diﬀerence between the ranks of top signaled workers equals one. (The general
case follows straightforwardly.) That is,




)) = rankf(Sf(;WS))   1:
The construction in the ﬁrst part of the proof works again in this case. Using sets of proﬁles
and a correspondence similar to the one above, we can show that the probabilities of ﬁrm f being
matched with Sf (Tf) are the same for WS and WS0
. Observe that if ﬁrm f’s oﬀer to Tf is accepted,
naturally ﬁrm f gets the same payoﬀ for sets WS and WS0
. If ﬁrm f’s oﬀer to Sf is accepted, ﬁrm
f gets strictly greater payoﬀ for set WS0
compared to set WS, because by deﬁnition Sf(;WS0
)
has smaller rank than Sf(;WS). Hence, if it is optimal for ﬁrm f to make an oﬀer to Sf(;WS)
when it receives set of signals WS, it is optimal for ﬁrm f to make an oﬀer to Sf(;WS0
) when
ﬁrm f receives set of signals WS0
.
Combined, the two statements we have just proved allow us to conclude that if ﬁrms  f use
anonymous strategies, ﬁrm f’s optimal strategy can be represented as some cutoﬀ strategy.33 
Proof of Theorem A1. As discussed in Section 4, in any symmetric non-babbling equilibrium
each worker sends its signal to its most preferred ﬁrm. Consequently, all information sets for ﬁrms
are realized with positive probability, so ﬁrm beliefs are determined by Bayes’ Law: if a ﬁrm receives
a signal from a worker, it believes that worker ranks the ﬁrm ﬁrst in its preference list. We now take
these worker strategies and ﬁrm beliefs as ﬁxed, and analyze the second stage of the game when
ﬁrms choose oﬀers. We will show that this reduced game is a super-modular game, and then use
the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to prove our theorem.
We analyze the game where we restrict ﬁrm strategies to be cutoﬀ strategies. Denote the
33Note that there can be other optimal strategies. If ﬁrm f is indiﬀerent between making an oﬀer to Sf and
making an oﬀer to Tf for some set of signals, ﬁrm f could optimally make its oﬀer to Sf or to Tf for any set of signals
conditional on maintaining the same rank of the most preferred signaling worker and cardinality of signals received.
40set of cutoﬀ strategy proﬁles as cut, with typical element  = (1;:::;F). Recall that a cutoﬀ
strategy for ﬁrm f is a vector f = (j1
f;:::;jW
f ) where jk
f corresponds to the cutoﬀ when ﬁrm f
receives k signals. We will consider only strategies where each cutoﬀ is a natural number, i.e.
jk
f 2 f1;:::;Wg. As deﬁned on p.15, vector comparison yields a natural partial order on cut:







for any f 2 F and k 2 f1;:::;Wg. This partial order is
reﬂexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
To show that the second stage is a game with strategic complementarities, we need to verify
that E(f(f; f;)) is super-modular in f, and that E(f(f; f;)) has increasing diﬀer-
ences in f and  f. The former is trivially true because when f shifts one of its cutoﬀ vector
components, this does not inﬂuence the change in payoﬀ from a shift of another cutoﬀ vector com-
ponent. Namely, if we consider 1














That E(f(f; f;)) has increasing diﬀerences in f and  f follows from Proposition 3. Namely,
for any f;  f; 0
f, and 0
 f such that 0
f  f and 0






Hence the second stage of the game, when ﬁrms choose their strategies, is a game with strategic
complementarities. Since in our model ﬁrms are ex-ante symmetric, Theorem 5 of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) establishes the existence of largest and smallest symmetric pure strategy equilibria.

Proof of Lemma A1. We prove the ﬁrst statement ﬁrst. Let us consider ﬁrm f cutoﬀ strategies
f and 0
f such that 0
f has weakly greater cutoﬀs. We consider two sets of preference proﬁles
 +  f 2 j m(f; f;) < m(0
f; f;)g
    f 2 j m(f; f;) > m(0
f; f;)g:
For each proﬁle  from set +, it must be the case that without ﬁrm f’s oﬀer, Tf has an oﬀer from
another ﬁrm and worker Sf does not:
m(0
f; f;)   m(f; f;) = 1: (B.1.1)
Similarly, if proﬁle  is from set  , it must be the case that without ﬁrm f oﬀer, Sf has an oﬀer
from another ﬁrm, and Tf does not
m(0
f; f;)   m(f; f;) =  1: (B.1.2)
We will now show that j +j  j  j. Equations (B.1.1) and (B.1.2), along with the fact that
41each  2 + [   occurs equally likely, will then be enough to prove the result.
Let us denote Tf = w0 and Sf = w: We construct function   :  !  as follows. Let  () be
the proﬁle in which workers have preferences as in , but ﬁrms  f all swap the positions of workers
w0 and w in their preference lists. If proﬁle  belongs to   , without ﬁrm f’s oﬀer, worker w has
an oﬀer from another ﬁrm, and worker w0 does not. Therefore, when preferences are  (), without
ﬁrm f’s oﬀer the following two statements must be true: i) worker w0 must have another oﬀer and
ii) worker w cannot have another oﬀer.
To see i), note that under , worker w sends a signal to ﬁrm f, so his outside oﬀer must come
from some ﬁrm f0 who has ranked him ﬁrst. Under proﬁle  (), ﬁrm f0 ranks worker w0 ﬁrst. If
worker w0 has not sent a signal to ﬁrm f0, then by anonymity, w0 gets the oﬀer of ﬁrm f0. If worker
w0 has signaled to ﬁrm f0, worker w0 again gets ﬁrm f0’s oﬀer:
To see ii), suppose to the contrary that under  (), worker w does in fact receive an oﬀer from
some ﬁrm f0 6= f. Since worker w sends a signal to ﬁrm f, worker w must be Tf0 under  (), so
that worker w0 is Tf0 under . But then by anonymity w0 receives the oﬀer of ﬁrm f0 under , a
contradiction.
From i) and ii), we have  2    )  () 2  +. Since function   is injective, we have
j +j  j  j.
In order to prove the second statement note that the expected number of matches of each worker
increases when ﬁrm f responds more to signals. Using the construction presented above, one can
show that whenever worker w “loses” a match with ﬁrm f for proﬁle  (worker w is Tf) it is possible
to construct proﬁle 0 when worker w obtains a match (worker w is Sf). The function that matches
these proﬁles is again injective. Moreover, worker w values more greatly the match with ﬁrm f
when she has signaled it (Sf) rather when she is simply highest ranked (Tf). Therefore, the ex-ante
utility of worker w increases when ﬁrm f responds more to signals. 
B.2 Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling Mechanism — Proofs and
Extensions
This set of results pertains to Section 6: Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling Mechanism.
In this section, we denote as u(j) the utility of a ﬁrm from matching with its jth ranked worker.
The ﬁrst proposition states that when preferences over workers are suﬃciently ﬂat, then in any
non-babbling equilibrium ﬁrms always respond to signals.










there is a unique non-babbling equilibrium in the oﬀer game with signals. Each worker sends her
signal to her top ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm f makes an oﬀer to Sf if it receives at least one signal; otherwise,
ﬁrm f makes an oﬀer to Tf.
42Proof. We will show that under condition (B.2.1) even if Sf is the worst ranked worker in ﬁrm
f preferences, ﬁrm f still optimally makes her an oﬀer.
Proposition 3 shows that if ﬁrms  f respond more to signals, i.e. increase their cutoﬀs, it is also
optimal for ﬁrm f to respond more to signals. Therefore, if ﬁrm f optimally responds to signals
when no other ﬁrm does, it will certainly optimally respond to signals when other ﬁrms respond.
Hence, it will be enough to consider the incentives of ﬁrm f when ﬁrms  f do not respond to signals
and always make an oﬀer their top ranked workers.
Let us consider some realized proﬁle of preferences of ﬁrm f and denote Tf as w. If ﬁrms  f
do not respond to signals, then some ﬁrm among  f makes an oﬀer to worker w with probability
q = 1
W . Therefore, the probability that the oﬀer of ﬁrm f to worker w is accepted equals
(1   q)
F 1 + ::: + C
j
F 1qj (1   q)
F 1 j 1





y!(x y)!. Intuitively, j ﬁrms among the other F   1 ﬁrms simultaneously make an oﬀer
to worker w with probability C
j
F 1qj(1 q)F 1 j. Therefore, ﬁrm f is matched with worker w only
with probability 1
j+1 because worker w’s preferences are uniformly distributed. The sum over all











Alternatively, if ﬁrm f makes an oﬀer to its top signaling worker, its oﬀer is accepted with
probability one. Therefore, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to make an oﬀer to the signaling worker only








u(1). We conclude that under Assumption (B.2.1) there is no other
non-babbling symmetric equilibrium in the oﬀer game with signals. 
The following proposition characterizes equilibria in the multi-period oﬀer game.











u(W) > u(1); v(W) > v(1)
Then
1. There is a unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in the oﬀer game with no signals and L
periods of interaction: each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its most preferred worker and each worker
accepts its best oﬀer in each period.
2. There is a unique symmetric, sequential, non-babbling (in each period) equilibrium in the oﬀer
game with signals and L periods of interaction: in period 0, each worker sends her signal to
her most preferred ﬁrm; in periods l = 1;:::;L, each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer at to its top signaling
worker among workers remaining in the market; otherwise the ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its top
43ranked worker among those in the market. Each worker accepts the best available oﬀer in each
period.
Proof. Consider the oﬀer game with no signals and L periods of interaction. We will apply
backward induction, examining ﬁrst the ﬁnal stage of the game. Since the ﬁnal stage of the game
is identical to a one period oﬀer game with no signals, in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the
subgame, each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its top ranked worker and each worker accepts best available
oﬀer.
Assumptions u(W) > u(1) and v(W) > v(1) guarantee that there is no incentive to hold oﬀers
or make dynamically strategic oﬀers. Since ﬁrms  f use symmetric anonymous strategies at stage
L   1 and stage L; the only optimal strategy of ﬁrm f at stage L   1 is to make an oﬀer to Tf.
Each worker who receives at least one oﬀer in stage L 1 optimally accepts the best available oﬀer
immediately. Similar logic applies to the other stages.
Now consider the oﬀer game with signals and L periods of interaction. The symmetry of the
strategies of workers  w and the anonymity of ﬁrm strategies guarantee that the equilibrium proba-
bility that a ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to worker w (across any of the L periods) conditional on receiving a
signal from w (and also conditional on not receiving her signal) is the same for all ﬁrms. Therefore,
workers optimally send their signals to their most preferred ﬁrm in period 0.
Observe that signals play a meaningful role for ﬁrms only in the ﬁrst period. Since u(W) > u(1)








u(1), each ﬁrm f makes a period 1 oﬀer to Sf if it received at least
one signal. Since v(W) > v(1); workers accept the best available oﬀers immediately. In period 2,
each remaining ﬁrm either received no signals or else saw its oﬀers rejected in period 1. Thereafter
ﬁrm oﬀers to their most preferred remaining workers prevail, as the logic of backward induction in
the oﬀer game with no signals and many periods applies to periods 2 through L. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Balanced Markets). We ﬁrst calculate an explicit formula for the
increase in the expected number of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism.
Lemma B1. Consider a market with W workers and F > 2 ﬁrms. The expected number of matches





































Proof of Lemma B1. Let us ﬁrst calculate the expected number of matches in the pure coor-
dination game with no signals. Proposition 1 establishes that the unique symmetric non-babbling
44equilibrium when agents use anonymous strategies is as follows. Each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to its top
worker and each worker accepts the best oﬀer among those available. We have already calculated


















Let us now calculate the expected number of matches in the oﬀer game with signals. Propo-
sition B1 derives agent strategies in the unique symmetric non-babbling equilibrium in the pure
coordination game with signals. Each worker sends her signal to her top ﬁrm and each ﬁrm makes
its oﬀer to its top signaling worker if it receives at least one signal, otherwise it makes an oﬀer to
its top ranked worker.
We ﬁrst calculate ex-ante probability of being matched by some ﬁrm f: We denote the set of
workers that send her signal to ﬁrm f as WS
f  W [ N. If ﬁrm f receives at least one signal,
jWS
f j > 0; it is guaranteed a match because each worker sends her signal to her top ﬁrm. If ﬁrm
f receives no signals, it makes an oﬀer to its top ranked worker Tf. This worker accepts ﬁrm f’s
oﬀer only if this oﬀer is the best one among those she receives. Let us denote the probability that
Tf accepts ﬁrm f0s oﬀer (under the condition that ﬁrm f receives no signals) as
PTf;jWS






The ex-ante probability that ﬁrm f is matched then equals
Prob_matchf(F;W) = P(jWS
f j > 0)  1 + P(jWS
f j = 0)  PTf;jWS
f j=0:
If ﬁrm f receives no signals, jWS
f j = 0; it makes an oﬀer to Tf, which we will call worker w.
Worker w receives an oﬀer from its top ranked ﬁrm, say ﬁrm f0, conditional on ﬁrm f receiving no
signals, jWS
f j = 0; with probability equal to
G = P(jWS
f0j = 1jjWS
f j = 0)  1 + ::: + P(jWS
f0j = WjjWS














Intuitively, ﬁrm f0 receives a signal from a particular worker with probability 1
F 1 (note that ﬁrm
f receives no signals). Then, if ﬁrm f0 receives signals from j other workers, worker w receives an
oﬀer from ﬁrm f0 with probability 1









Firm f can be matched with worker w only if worker w does not receive an oﬀer from its top
ﬁrm, which happens with probability 1   G. If worker w does not receive an oﬀer from her top
ﬁrm   ﬁrm f0   ﬁrm f competes with other ﬁrms that have received no signals from workers.
45The probability that some ﬁrm f0 among ﬁrms Fnff;f0g receives no signals conditional on the
fact that worker w sends her signal to ﬁrm f0 and ﬁrm f receives no signals (jWS
f j = 0) equals
r = (1   1
F 1)W 1. Note that the probability that ﬁrm f0 does not receive a signal from a worker
equals 1  1
F 1, because ﬁrm f receives no signals. There are also only W  1 workers that can send
a signal to ﬁrm f0, because worker w sends her signal to ﬁrm f0:
Therefore, the probability that some ﬁrm f0 among ﬁrms Fnff;f0g receives no signals and
makes an oﬀer to worker w, conditional on the fact that worker w sends her signal to ﬁrm f0, equals
r
W . Therefore, the probability that worker w prefers the oﬀer of ﬁrm f to other oﬀers (conditional


















The probability that worker w accepts ﬁrm f0s oﬀer then equals
PTf;jWS











Taking into account that ﬁrm f receives no signals with probability P(jWS
f j = 0) = (1   1
F )W; the
probability of ﬁrm f being matched in the oﬀer game with signals is then
Prob_matchf(F;W) = 1   (1   1
















where r = (1   1
F 1)W 1. The expected total number of matches in the oﬀer game with signals
equals mS(F;W) = F  Prob_matchf(F;W). 
Lemma B1 establishes the expected total number of matches in the oﬀer game with and without
signals. Let us ﬁrst ﬁx W and calculate where the increase in the expected number of matches
from the introduction of the signaling mechanism, V (F;W) = mS(F;W)   mNS(F;W); attains its
maximum. In order to derive the result of the proposition we consider markets with a large number
of ﬁrms and workers and we use Taylor’s expansion formula:
(1   a)
b = exp( ab + O(a2b)); (B.2.5)
where O(a2b) is a function that is smaller than a constant for large values of a2b: Using the result of
Lemma B1 and formular (B.2.5) one could immediately calculate the approximation of the expected
number of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism in large markets
V (F;W) = W








)   1 + e x

+ O(1)
34Note that the maximum number of oﬀers worker w could get equals to M  1 as it does not receive an oﬀer from
its top ﬁrm f0.
46where we denote x = F
W . Therefore V (F;W) = W(x) + O(1); where (x) is a positive quasi-
concave function that attains maximum at x0 ' 1:012113. Therefore, for ﬁxed W, V (F;W) attains
its maximum value at F = x0W + O(1): Similar to the previous derivation, we can ﬁx F and
calculate.
V (F;W) = F














Therefore V (F;W) = F(x) + O(1), where (x) is a positive quasi-concave function that attains
maximum at x00 ' 0:53074. Therefore, for ﬁxed F, V (F;W) attains its maximum value at W =
y0F + O(1), where y0 = 1=x00 = 1:8842: 
Proof of Proposition 5 (Multiple Periods). We will prove the argument under assumptions on
agents’ utility and discount factor of Propositions B2 that guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium
in the games with and without signals.
For clarity of the argument, we compare markets with one and two periods of interaction.
Consider a market with two periods. Since workers can send only one signal and ﬁrms respond to
all signals, all ﬁrms that receive at least one signal leave the market in period 1 (signals indicate that
oﬀers will be accepted for sure). Therefore, no ﬁrms remaining in period 2 have received signals, so
the second period of the oﬀer game with signals is identical to a single period oﬀer game with no
signals.
Since the introduction of the signaling mechanism increases the expected number of matches,
the expected number of remaining market participants in period 2 is greater in the oﬀer game with
no signals than it is in the oﬀer game with signals. As Proposition 4 shows, the number of matches
in a market with one period is proportional to the size of the market. Therefore, the expected
number of matches in the second period in the oﬀer game with no signals is greater than in the
oﬀer game with signals. In other words, the second period plays a more signiﬁcant role in the oﬀer
game with no signals. Hence, the diﬀerence between the expected number of matches in the oﬀer
game with signals and the oﬀer game with no signals decreases upon adding the second period of
interaction. This logic extends to L periods of interaction. 
47